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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CORPORATIONS
By GERALD H. KOPEL*
Most of this article will deal with the law of agency because
the Colorado Supreme Court decisions in the field of business asso-
ciations were concerned mainly with agency law.
I. AGENCY
A. Fiduciary Duty
The fiduciary duty owed by an agent to his principal is the
cornerstone of their relationship. Competition by the agent without
the consent of the principal was justifiably disapproved by the
Colorado Supreme Court in 1961 in several cases.
In Dawson v. Clark,' plaintiff sold his business to defendants and
contracted to remain as an employee in a "supervisory capacity"
for one year. Before the year ended, plaintiff was fired. The court
held that dismissal of plaintiff was justified because while he was
employed he "carried on the same type of business in his own name
and at times submitted bids in competition with'"2 his employers.
The case provides good orthodox law from Bilz v. Powell;3
namely, that a servant cannot engage in any business or employ-
ment in competition with his master, which may tend to injure the
latter's business, without the consent of his master. The supreme
court notes, without comment, the lower courts decision to award
plaintiff money found to be due on account of services rendered
prior to the date of his discharge. This would appear to support the
paraphrasing of another rule enunciated in Bilz v. Powell;4 the rule,
that is by no means uniform throughout the country, that a servant,
justifiably discharged for a breach of fiduciary duty, is still entitled
to compensation already earned and accrued.
In Addressograph-Multigraph Corp. v. Kelley,5 two former sales
agents of plaintiff were enjoined from engaging in competition
with plaintiff. The injunction was based upon a provision of the
contract entered into by the salesmen at the time of their employ-
ment.6 The supreme court found tho provision to be reasonable and
a sufficient block to the use of advantageous information, concern-
ing present and prospective customers of plaintiff, which defendants
acquired in connection with their employment.
Member of the Denver firm of Kopel and Kopel.
3 358 P.2d 591 (Colo. 1961).
2 358 P.2d 591, 592 (Colo. 1961).
350 Colo. 482, 117 Pec. 344 (1911).
4 Ibid.
5 362 P.2d 184 (Colo. 1961).
6 Id. at 185. "Incmuch as Salesman through his connection with Compny will obtain confi-
dential information recirding Company's methods of doing business, records, and the names and
requirements of users of Company's equipment throughout Company's territory, which it would be
improper to use to Company's detriment, or in competition with Company, therefor, in port consid-
eration for this agreement Salesman expressly hereby agrees and covenants that for a period of
one year from and after the termination of this Contract by either party he will not, without the
written consent of Company, engage, directly or indirectly, for himself or as agent or employee
of another in the manufacturing, selling, buying, dealing or servicing of . . . within 100 miles of ......
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Several other cases dealt with competition.7
B. Apparent Authority
Defendants purchased land from the City of Aurora.8 The written
offer (which was accepted by the city council) included a promise
by defendants to place a drainage pipe on their land of the same
size, and connecting with two city-maintained drainage pipes located
on opposite boundaries. Defendants sought instruction and approval
of their proposed plans and specifications for the drainage pipe
from the city manager. They were referred to the city engineer,
who rejected their plans and who then himself designed the pipe
which was installed by the defendants. The pipe installed was
smaller than the connecting pipes. Concrete was poured into the
void left at the connections, forming an unbroken, continuing tube.
All this was done at the direction and dictate of the city engineer,
who, after suggesting minor changes which were made, approved
the end result.
Following heavy rains, the neighborhood was flooded, due
allegedly to the failure of the smaller connecting pipe to adequately
carry the runoff from the larger pipe. Landowners sued defendants
and the city for damages resulting from flooding. The city sought
damages by cross-claim from defendants for their failure to con-
struct a pipe of the same size as the connecting pipes. All issues
were settled except those between the city and defendants. The
lower court entered judgment in favor of the city, which judgment
was reversed by the supreme court.
The supreme court conceded that the engineer had no actual
authority to modify the terms of the contract; since he could not
have entered into the contract, he was not expressly empowered
to modify it. But, the court stated, a municipal corporation cannot
supervise every detail of performance and then repudiate the
supervisory authority of its own engineer, by claiming that the
contracting party should have disregarded the instructions of the
city's agent, notwithstanding the agent's disapproval. There was
"justifiable reliance on the appearance of authority which was
exhibited to these defendants."9 The reliance was to their detri-
ment.
Besides using the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the court quotes
Seavy and the Restatement'0 on the estoppel theory of apparent
authority, as a basis for its decision. Normally, to qualify under
this theory, there is needed: (a) a principal who, by his conduct,
has misrepresented the existence of authority of an "agent" to a
third person, and (b) reliance by the third person on appearance
of authority and a subsequent change of position. The principal is
then bound because he is estopped to deny the "truth of his words."
7 England v. Colorado Agency Co.. 359 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1961); Swart v. Mid-Continent Refrigerator
Co., 360 P.2d 440 (Colo. 1961). In Swart v. Mid-Continent, two defendant partners were doing
business under the trade name "Mid-Commercial Refrigeration Co." Plaintiff's firm was "Mid-
Continent Refrigerator Co." The defendants were former employees of Mid-Continent, and one
was discharged after plaintiff discovered he was soliciting business for Mid-Commercial. The
supreme court concluded that the obvious purpose of defendants in adopting a name similar to
that of plaintiff was to benefit from the goodwill established by plaintiff, and approved the con-
tinuation of an injunction against defendants' use of the trade-name.
8 Franks v. City of Aurora, 362 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id. at 563.
10 Seavy, Studies in Agency 184 (1949); Restatement, Agency § 8 (1958).
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There is no contract between the principal and the third person with
whom the "agent" deals. The one estopped (the principal) is given
no rights, and the third person is either compensated for his loss
or protected from harm.
While inclusion of the doctrine of apparent authority by estoppel
does not detract from the justifiable decision rendered, it does add
more fuel to the twin flames which light the rationale by which
too many cases of similar nature are decided, i.e., estoppel and rati-
fication. Where the court is handicapped in finding a change in
position necessary for estoppel, or where the facts justify holding
each side bound to a contract, ratification is used. The "contract"
theory of apparent authority has been misplaced in Colorado.
Nout,, Te.. . I m~r. ep ,.-
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Under the contract theory, there is a "real" contract from the
inception under which each party has both rights and liabilities.
There is no need for straining the facts to fit the multi-requirements
of ratification, or to find a change in position.'Each theory has its
proper place, and should be used where justified by the facts.
Seavy, the author quoted by the supreme court in speaking of
estoppel as an aspect of apparent authority, favors the contract
approach."
C. Agent or Independent Contractor
In Argonaut Builders, Inc. v. Dare,2 defendant was engaged in
soliciting building contracts, and in representing plaintiff in other
dealings with customers; profits and losses to be divided 60-40.
Because of the nature of the business, defendant's share of the
profits was often delayed, and plaintiff made regular advances in
varying amounts which coincided with the bringing in of business.
Defendant received weekly statements from plaintiff which showed
profits credited, losses debited, the old deficit and the new deficit
based upon advances made.
There was no written contract to show the exact nature of the
relationship of plaintiff and defendant. When defendant termin-
ated his work with plaintiff, he was overdrawn on plaintiff's books,
based upon the advances, for $2,473. Plaintiff sued to recover the
money, claiming it was loaned to defendant and that defendant
was an independent contractor. Defendant maintained that he was
a commission salesman (therefore an agent); that the sum involved
constituted drawing account advances (thus in the nature of
salary) and no repayment was contemplated.
At the end of plaintiff's case, defendant's motion to dismiss was
granted. The supreme court reversed the trial court and held that
plaintiff's evidence that defendant was an independent contractor
was sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss.
A hasty reading of this decision could lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. The court says that "from the circumstances it appears that
the defendant operated . . .free of control by the plaintiff." 13 How-
ever, the circumstances showing absence of control were not fully
explained in the decision. The payment to defendant based upon
the amount of profit, in the form of advances which varied as to
amounts, and the plaintiff's running tabulation of defendant's
account with weekly statements to the defendant is as conducive
to a finding of principal-agent as it is to a finding of independent
contractor.
4
Of much greater significance is the sharing of losses by defend-
ant. Sharing of profits by an agent as an inducement for greater
efficiency is now a normal custom, but the sharing of losses to the
extent that an "agent" might earn less than zero annually, would
certainly not be customary.
Although the court does seem to stress the fluctuation in "the
manner of making advances"'15 by plaintiff, it is difficult to tell
11 Seavy, The Rationale of Agency, 29 Yale Li.J. 859, 873 (1920); Seavy, Studies in Agency 82-83
(1949).
12 359 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1961).
13 Id. at 367.
142 Am. Jur. Aqency J 311 (1936).
1 . Supro note 12, at 367.
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whether this applied to the varying amounts paid (ranging from
$10 to $400) or to a time lapse in the periods when the sums were
paid. Nor is it clear whether this fluctuation is evidence of the
non-existence of principal-agent relationship, or of a debt regard-
less of the relationship.
However, the rule suggested by the court would appear to be:
Payments to an employee in the nature of advances are wages or
salary when they (a) are to be charged to and deducted from
commissions agreed upon as the same may accrue, and (b) are
made in regular amounts in consideration of continued activity by
the employee. Because of this regularity of payment and the require-
ment that the employee give full time to his employment, the.
presumption arises that the advances are recoverable only from
commissions and thus the excess cannot be collected by the employ-
er in absence of an express or implied agreement to repay.
D. Vicarious Liability - Respondeat Superior
1. Joint Employers. - In Colorado & S. Ry. v. Duffy Storage &
Moving Van Co., 16 a train, operating under a joint agreement by
the Colorado and Southern Railway Company and the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway, negligently damaged plaintiff's
truck, trailer, and crane. Defendant Santa Fe claimed it had nothing
to do with operation of the train and should not be held respon-
sible for negligent operation by the engineer. The engineer was
an employee of Colorado and Southern Railway Company, but, on
the "run" of the train at the time of the accident, he was paid by
Santa Fe and was responsible to the Santa Fe superintendent.
The supreme court held both railroads liable as joint employers
"notwithstanding the particular service being rendered was for
only one of the employers, and the employee was paid directly by
only one of the joint employers. The legal rule of liability cannot
be affected by a contract which provides that one of several joint
employers shall bear the entire responsibility for the act of their
joint employee."' 7 The court then points out that the matter of
who made payments is not determinative in this case, stating that
liability would apply against one who "knowingly and without
objection receives the benefits of labor, or holds out to the public
one as engaged in his service ... when the act or failure constitut-
ing the negligence comes within the apparent scope of the servant's
employment .... "'s quoting Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Gustafson.19
If the court is basing its decision upon a holding out to the
public and an apparent scope of employment, then it is conceivably
using the language of apparent authority by estoppel, and comment
is required.
The facts in the Gustafson case are considerably different from
the facts in Colorado & S. Ry. v. Duffy Storage & Moving Van Co.
The former case dealt with a flagman, and plaintiff testified he
16 361 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1961).
17 1.4 at 147. cuotina 35 Am. Jur., Master and Servant J 537 (1936). Nor can liability be
affected by promulgoting rules or establishing customs, practices or usage, or adopting constructons
thereto so as to absolve oneself of his own imputed ncgligence: Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Lloyd, 364
P.2d 873, 876 (Colo. 1961).
18 361 P.2d 144, 148 (Colo. 1961).
19 21 Colo. 393, 41 Pac. 505 (1895).
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relied solely upon the flagman for safe transit. The flagman was
well known to the public, having been stationed at the same place
for nearly ten years, flagging trains for two companies, and so far
as the public could know, was serving two companies. Thus the
court was justified in speaking of a holding out which leads to
estoppel and which requires reliance by the injured person. But
it can hardly be said that the driver of plaintiff's truck relied upon
the engineer of the train that caused the accident as being the
servant of the Santa Fe Railway, especially since the train was
that of the Colorado and Southern Railway. In the Gustafson case,
the plaintiff moved forward into the area of impact because the
-flagman signaled him to go ahead. Can it be said in Colorado &
S. Ry. v. Duffy Storage & Moving Van Co. that plaintiff would not
have placed himself in a perilous position except for his reliance on
a particular engineer as a servant of two railways?
2. Family Car Doctrine. - The indicia of ownership of a car is
sufficient to justify the application of the family car doctrine, with
resultant imputed negligence to the owner who permits members
of his household to drive it for their pleasure or convenience, even
if the owner of record does not drive the vehicle and has been repaid
the entire purchase price by the negligent member of the household
who drives the car. This is the rule of Appelhans v. Kirkwood.
20
3. No Indemnification If Not Vicarious. - William F. Larrick,
Inc. v. Burt Chevrolet, Inc.21 supports the general rule that a
20 365 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1961).
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master who ,actively supervises and participates in the negligent
acts of his serv~ant is not entitled to indemnity from the servant for
damages which .the master must pay to an injured person. The
active supervision and participation precludes application of the
rule where the master, whose liability is based upon the doctrine
of respondeat superior, is entitled to indemnification from the
servant.
22
4. Workmen's Compensation. - Agency law does not technically
include workmen's compensation cases since they are governed by
special statutes and strict case interpretations. Moreover, as to
vicarious liability, the law of agency is designed to aid an innocent
third party, while workmen's compensation law provides benefits
to an employee. Nevertheless, the Colorado cases on workmen's
compensation are important as aids in anticipating possible decisions
as to whether respondeat superior will apply in given situations.
Where an employee is "looking the town over" or "killing time,"
his injury does not arise out of and in the course of his employment
even though the employee is in the particular town for the purpose
of contacting an agent of his employer.
23
An employee sustained a fatal injury while playing for a softball
team sponsored by his employer. The game was conducted during
off hours and in a public park. The employer and the municipality
joined in financing the activity. The advertising value to the em-
ployer was negligible and the benefits derived by it consisted en-
tirely in the indirect improvement of employee morale. It was held
that the injury was not compensable as the activity was not an in-
cident of employment.
24
An employee of the Game and Fish Department was killed
while driving a department tractor down a mountain trail after
inspecting a privately owned television antenna behind his depart-
ment-owned residence. The accident was held to arise out of and
within the scope of employment.2 5 The supreme court reasoned that
because deceased was on 24-hour call, 7 days per week, was
required to live on department property in a remote area, was
expected to maintain the premises, including residence and appur-
tenances, and because the use of television was approved as a
morale factor, the activity (repairing the antenna) was a direct
and real benefit to his employer, as distinguished from Lindsay v.
Public Service Co. 26
A Denver geologist was employed by Geophoto to perform work
in Lybia." After completing his mission, he and his wife, on travel
orders from Geophoto, returned to the United States enroute to
Denver. While returning by car to Denver, the geologist was fatally
injured in an automobile accident in Pennsylvania. At the time of
the accident, the geologist was on the Pennsylvania turnpike travel-
ing in an easterly direction. Defendants claimed no liability because
the deceased was traveling east, away from Denver, at the time
22 Hamm v. Thompson, 143 Colo. 298, 353 P.2d 73 (1960).
23 General Plant Protection Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1961). There is a
strong and compelling dissent by Justice Frantz.
24 Lindsay v. Public Service Co., 362 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1961).
25 Game & Fish Dep't v. Pardoo, 363 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1961).
26362 P.2d 407 (Colo. 1961).
27 Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 363 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1961).
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of the accident, and was thus in a personal activity not within the
course of his employment.
In the following language the supreme court held the death
was compensable:
It seems clear that the plaintiff, who was traveling pur-
suant to company orders, was within the scope and cover-
age of the Act even though he was at the moment of
impact driving in the wrong direction. It would be both
illogical and unjust to hold the injury non-compensable
because of a temporary direction departure occurring in the
course of a covered journey of several thousand miles.
Claimants satisfied their burden when they showed .. .
traveling pursuant to orders. It was incumbent on the
insurer to show a specific deviation.
2
"The only evidence offered before the commission was offered
on behalf of the claimants.
29
The court goes astray in delving at great length into the "dual
purpose" theory (as presented by Larson on Workmen's Compen-
sation 30) and in only casually justifying its decision on the basis of
a negligible deviation.
31
The dual purpose theory, as stated by Justice Cardozo in Marks'
Dependents v. Gray32 and interpreted by Larson,33 is that the injury
is compensable if it occurred on a trip which was concurrently for
business and pleasure, and where, if the pleasure portion were
cancelled, the trip for business would have had to be made anyway,
if not by the specific traveler, then by some other employee at
another time.
In all the dual purpose cases cited by Larson, both personal
and business purposes are set forth. But if there was a personal
purpose for the geologist's deviation, it was not stated in the
supreme court's decision.
34
Moreover, the cases cited by the court from Larson 35 are simply
illustrations of the dual purpose rule, and are not necessarily
germane to a deviation situation. At the risk of presenting too stark
an explanation, it could be said that dual purpose is concerned with
the reasons for originally beginning a journey or a particular portion
of a journey, while deviation is concerned with the geographical
location of (a) the accident, and (b) the employment destination.
In National Sugar Mfg. Co. v. Bauer,36 a factory superintendent,
who was responsible for efficient operations of the factory, had no
specific working hours and often made trips combining company
business with pleasure or personal affairs. His wife often accom-
panied him. At the time of his death, he was driving from the plant
to Pueblo. His wife was riding with him to do some shopping in the
2, Id. at 649.
29 Id. at 647.
30 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 18.12 (1961).
31 Id. §8 19.50, 25.00.
32 251 N.Y. 90, 167 N.E. 181 (1929).
33 1 Larson, supra note 30, § 18.13.
34 The supreme court does recognize that if an employee is troveling away from home, then
staying at a motel, eating at a restaurant, and going to and from those places comes w;thin the
compensation act. Employer's Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Caom'n, 363 P.2d 646, 648 (Colo. 1961).
:15 1 Larson, supra note 30, § 18.12.
:16 366 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1961).
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city. The evidence showed he had stated he would not go to Pueblo
in such weather "if I did not have to;" he took some specifications
from the factory with him; and the 'company had considerable
business dealings in the city. The court held he was within the
scope of employment when the accident occurred, but no mention
was made in the decision of the "dual purpose" rule stated in
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n.37
5. Loaned Servant-Whose Employee? - Plaintiff Erbes was an
employee of M & A Enterprises,38 a firm which contracted with
defendant Sugar Company to construct sugar bins on the latter's
property. M & A rented a crane and operator (defendant Nickle)
from Sugar Company. While Nickle was operating the crane, he
negligently injured plaintiff. The plaintiff collected workmen's
compensation and sued both defendants for negligence, alleging
Nickle was the servant of Sugar Company. The jury verdict for
plaintiff was affirmed by the supreme court.
The question involved was whether the loaned servant became
the servant of the special employer (M & A), or remained the ser-
vant of his general employer (Sugar Company).39 Nickle was paid
by his general employer. There was a rental of a valuable ma-
chine, together with a skilled operator, for a short period of time.
Sugar Company could replace Nickle at any time, they were respon-
sible for maintenance and repair of the crane, and M & A had no
right to discharge Nickle.
The supreme court has stressed the business of renting equip-
ment as a strong indication of intent of the general employer not
to release control of its servant.40 Sugar Company contended it
was not in the business of renting cranes, but the evidence showed
the rental had been provided to others doing work on the Sugar
Company premises, which, while a restricted type of rental, was
37 363 P.2d 646 (Colo. 1961).
38 Great Western Sugar Co. v. Erbes, 367 P.2d 329 (Colo. 1961).
39 For an interesting Colorado resume of modern loaned servant cases, read Chartier v. Winslow,
142 Colo. 294, 350 P.2d 1044 (1960) (regular employee sues loaned servant's general employer);
Jacobson v. Doan, 136 Colo. 496, 319 P.2d 975 (1957) (loaned servant sues special employer); and
Netherton v. Haver, 140 Colo. 140, 342 P.2d 671 (1959) (innocent third person sues loaned servant's
general employer).
40 Chartier v. Winslow, 142 Colo. 294, 311, 350 P.2d 1044, 1053 (1960). Restatement, Torts, § 227,
: ". . . the fact that the general employer is in the business of renting machines and men is
relevant, since in such cases there is more likely to be an intent to retain control over the
instrumentality. The person who is not in such business and who, gratuitously or not, as a matter
not within his general business enterprise, permits his servant and instrumentality to assist another,
is more apt to intend to surrender control."
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Experienced Office Girls to Meet All Law Office Needs
ON YOUR STAFF ON OUR PAYROLL
IN COLORADO SPRINGS - IN DENVER * IN GREELEY
MEirose 3-4659 292-2920 ELgin 2-5922
MIDLAND BLDG. 240 Petroleum Club Bldg. GREELEY BLDG.
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
still a business of renting. The supreme court felt the rental issue
was relevant, but not determinative of the issue, and that the
question of "loaned servant" was properly submitted to the jury.
41
E. Liability of Agent to Third Person - Contract
When a person signs his name to a simple contract, without
designating that he does so as an officer or agent or in a repre-
sentative capacity acting for or on behalf of another, and the
principal's name does not appear in the instrument as principal
of the person signing, then the one signing is personally liable on
the contract so signed. The president of a corporation discovered
this, to his detriment, in Sago v. Ashford,42 when he responded to
an offer of sale by writing at the bottom of the offering letter "we
wish to order this equipment as specified above. Fred Sago.
' 43
Although the term "undisclosed principal" was not used by the
court in its decision, it was present as an added factor when the
court stated ". . . evidence was sufficient . . . that neither the
instrument itself nor other circumstances advised the seller of the
existence of the corporation or the claimed representative capacity
of Sago.'"44 When there is an "undisclosed principal" both the prin-
cipal and agent are liable in the alternative.
One issue is not clear in the decision and might disturb the
reader. The written offer was directed to "Howard Sand and
Gravel Co. - Mr. Fred Sago." The testimony of the seller at the
trial left a strong inference that the seller considered the company
as the "trade name" of Mr. Sago, and an indication by the court to
this effect would have been helpful.
In Frye v. Switzer,45 the plaintiff sought to collect from an agent
of a home-building corporation for items sold to the corporation.
Plaintiff claimed defendant made a personal commitment to pay
a debt carried on plaintiff's books as a corporation debt. The supreme
court found that the language used 46 to promise payment was in-
sufficient to warrant a judgment against defendant.
In Empire Diesel, Inc. v. Brown,47 the plaintiff, a former em-
ployee, sought to collect loans he claimed were made to his corporate
employer. Defendant claimed the loans were made to Mr. Clark,
the president of the corporation, and not to the corporation itself.
Defendant was in the business of repairing trucks, and loans were
made to purchase needed items of repair. Clark requested the:
loans, the checks named Clark as payee, and the money was deposit-
ed to the corporation account.
41 The circle is now completed as to when an injured employee may bring an action for
negligence rather than recover only under workmen's compensation. (a) General contractor's
employee sues landowner for negligence when contractor carries workmen's compensation: Great
Western Sugar Co. v. Erbes, supra note 38; (b) Sub-contractor's employee sues general contractor
for negligence when sub-contractor carries workmen's compensation: Whiting v. Farnsworth &
Chambers Co., 293 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1961); (c) General contractor's employee sues sub-contractor
for negligence when general contractor carries workmen's compensation: Chartier v. Winslow, 142
Colo. 294, 317, 350 P.2d 1044, 1056 (1960).
42 358 P.2d 599 (Colo. 1961).
43 Id. at 600.
44 Ibid.
45 359 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1961).
46 Id. at 371. "Q ... you promised to make payment . .?""A. As we could, because the
corporation had homes they had money coming from, surely." C".. Frye said he would pay
the balance due . . . out of 'closings' that he had coming up...") The supreme court said: "It
was the corporation, not Frye, which was 'closing' deals for the sale of homes."




[HI e made use of personal pronouns in referring to Clark
and himself. He also mentioned Clark by name. He
explained that Clark was solely in charge of the business
... and that no thought was given to a distinction between
Clark and the corporation as referring to separate entities.
This was not natural to Brown, Clark was the corporation
and the corporation was Clark.
48
The court held that under the circumstances, "... it is a per-
missible, if not necessary, inference that the loans were made to
the corporation.
'49
F. Attorneys as Agents
In Eadon v. Reuler,50 a frustrated divorce-litigant turned upon
the attorneys who represented the parties, alleging fraud, conni-
vance and conspiracy. The supreme court upheld the dismissal of
the litigant's complaint seeking damages and in language, which
attorneys perhaps should frame and place in view for clients to
see, states:
A lawyer does not guarantee results. He merely undertakes
to use his best skill and judgment. A result unsatisfactory
to the litigant scarcely justifies a suit charging the lawyers
with fraud and conspiracy. Efforts of a lawyer to obtain an
amicable disposition do not subject him to a charge of
treason.51
Rupp v. Cool 52 contains a definite admonition to attorneys that
they are to be treated as a special class in contracting for fees with
their clients because of the confidential relationship involved. The
plaintiff, employed by defendant as his attorney, rendered the
required services and his bill for $2500. The client tendered $1000,
and refused to comply with monthly statements which followed,
requesting payment of the remaining $1500. Nothing was said about
compensation until the work was completed, and the testimony
.was in conflict as to whether the defendant, at that time, protested
and refused to pay the entire sum.
48 Id. at 965-66.
49 Id. at 966.
50361 P.2d 445 (Colo. 1961).
51 Id. at 450.
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The supreme court stated the following rules: (a) An attorney
and his prospective client may enter into a contract with reference
to fees to be charged and such a contract will be treated and con-
strued as other contracts. The client is regarded as competent to
judge for himself what is a proper sum to pay for services, and it
cannot be repudiated merely because of the subsequent confidential
relationship.53 (b) After the confidential relationship of attorney
and client exists, the law governing fee contracts subsequently
entered into between them is very different. The burden is then on
the attorney to prove that the agreement was fairly and openly
made, that it was supported by an adequate consideration, that he
gave the client full knowledge of the facts and of his legal rights,
and that the services to be performed were reasonably worth the
amount stated in the agreement.
54
Several other cases dealt with attorneys as agents. 55
G. Real Estate Agents
"[W] ithout paying for the seed he sought to reap the field that
the broker had sowed. The scheme is very old, but so is the law
which frustrates it." 56 Brewer v. Williams57 differs from most suits
by real estate brokers for commissions in that the contract of
employment, resulting in a principal-agent relationship, was oral
and implied from the particular circumstances of the case, namely;
awareness, encouragement, and repeated inquiries by the owner
of the progress made to effect a sale.
Defendant circumvented the brokers and sold directly to pur-
chasers that the brokers had produced. No commission was due
the brokers, defendant urged, because they failed to comply with
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 117-2-1 (1953), which requires finding a purchaser
ready to complete purchase on terms proposed by the seller. The
court found that no rigidity was ever placed upon the brokers as to
the types of offers defendant would consider.
This case reaffirmed the rule that a broker who procures a
purchaser ready, willing and able to purchase upon the terms and
conditions imposed by the owner is entitled to his commission even
though the owner and the purchaser thereafter conduct further
negotiations resulting in a change of the terms.ss
H. Miscellaneous
Fistell v. Centennial Truck Lines, Inc. 9 would appear to be
authority for the following general rule: After a sale, when the
53 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client 181 (1937).
54 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 204(3) (1937); Enyort v. Orr, 78 Colo. 6, 238 Pac. 29 (1925).
55 Attorneys should note, as pointed out in Burgess v. Federated Credit Service, Inc., 365 P.2d 264
(Colo. 1961), that Colorado's statutes provide inroads into areas which are mistakenly considered the
private domains of attorneys. Thus, prosecution of suits in courts which ore not courts of record need
not be carried on by licensed attorneys. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 79.5-17 (1953). In workmen's compensa-
tion cases, either side may be represented by oersons other than attorneys. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-
14-3 (1953). Whatley v. Wood, 366 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1961), points out that an attorney for the direc-
tor-trustees of a defendant corporation cannot, in the process of discharging the employment entered
upon as counsel, acqure the property of the corporation.
56 Brewer v. Williams, 362 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Colo. 1961).
57 Ibid.
58 Id. at 1036. Compare the Brewer case with Scott v. Huntzinger, 365 P.2d 692 (Colo. 1961),
where the court held that a broker under agreement providing for commission if owners sold a lease-
hold interest to optionee as provided in the agreement had no right to a commission where the op-
tionee did not exercise the option thereunder, notwithstanding the fact that optionee subsequently,
acting on behalf of himself and others, resumed negotiations culminating in purchase, absent any
showing of bad faith or conspiracy to let the option lapse with intent to deprive the broker of his
commission.
59 359 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961).
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buyer requests the seller to ship the goods to the buyer, the
seller, in choosing without negligence a carrier to deliver the goods,
is acting as agent for the buyer-principal, and is not liable for
damages to the buyer caused by non-delivery by the carrier of
some of the goods purchased.
Wilder v. Baker60 is authority for the rule that notice to an agent
imputes knowledge to the principal only when it is within the
scope of the agent's authority to accept notice. Here, plaintiff sued
defendant as one of two joint obligors. Defendant pleaded bank-
ruptcy prior to suit, but his bankruptcy schedule did not list the
transaction with plaintiff. Defendant advised plaintiff's agent of the
bankruptcy proceedings, but the only evidence of authority of the
agent was to collect payments from defendant and apply them to
the obligation owed. "There is nothing in the evidence to indicate
it was within the scope of . . . authority to accept notice of bank-
ruptcy . . .on behalf of the plaintiff and, therefore, the knowledge
of the ... bankruptcy ... cannot be imputed to the plaintiff." 61 The
court fails to cite any authority for its decision, although the fact
situation is not uncommon.
6 2
Unless an agent is himself responsible for unpaid sums due his
principal from third persons, the agent is not the real party in
interest to sue such third persons, according to Baumgartner v.
Burt.63 In this case, insurance agents sued the insured to recover
unpaid premiums for policies issued by the insurance company.
The supreme court held that unless the agent is personally liable
to insurer for the premiums, then the general rule applies that an
agent cannot maintain a suit in its own name for an insurance
premium due its principal.
II. CORPORATIONS
A. Procedural Requirements
State of Colorado ex rel. Gentles v. Barnholt64 was an action by
Gentles in the nature of quo warranto to test the right of the
Barnholt slate of directors to hold office as directors of the cor-
poration. The pertinent issue presented to the supreme court was
on allegations that Barnholt caused treasury stock of the corpor-
ation to be sold, after the election, to a Henry Pui Chun of Honolulu,
Hawaii. Having accomplished this, Barnholt then caused the votes
of such stock to be counted as cast for his slate at the election.
Barnholt claims that Chun must be joined as an indispensable
party. The supreme court ruled that a non-resident shareholder
need not be joined if the action is merely one to review the pro-
priety of the election and does not seek any action directly or
indirectly against the particular shareholder whose vote is being
challenged. The supreme court felt that to hold otherwise would
result in an impotent right to challenge an election, since personal
60 362 P.2d 1045 (Colo. 1961).
61 Id. at 1047.
62 2 Am. Jur. Agency § 374 (1936).
63 365 P.2d 681 (Colo. 1961). Several other minor Colorado cases dealing with the law of Agency
;re: Minissole v. Goldman, 363 P.2d 488 (Colo. 1961) (real estate agents); Lasnetske v. Parres, 365
P.2d 250 (Colo. 1961) (vicarious liability, joint ownership of car, right to exercise control); and Bun-
nell v. Iverson, 364 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1961) (symbolic delivery to agent of gift cousa mortis).
64 358 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1961).
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service could not be had upon Chun until he came within the
borders of Colorado, which was unlikely.
The legality of the issuance of the stock to Chun cannot be
adjudicated without his presence, but his right to vote in the
election could be, according to the Delaware cases adopted by the
supreme court as establishing a better approach to the problem.65
In Norton v. Dartmouth Skis, Inc., 6 the supreme court again
points out that business may be sufficient to subject a foreign cor-
poration to service of process within the state, and yet insufficient
to subject the corporation to the power of the state to impose reg-
ulations upon its activities.
Plaintiff sought money due him as commissions, but the com-
plaint was filed more than six years after the cause of action
accrued. Defendant claimed the action was barred by the statute
of limitations, but plaintiff alleged that the foreign corporation
was not licensed to do business in this state, was absent therefrom,
and the statute had been tolled.
However, the corporation had since 1937 been selling in Colo-
rado through local salesmen who carried samples and merchandise
catalogues. Customer orders were given to the local salesmen who
chose the means of delivery, assisted in collecting delinquent
accounts, solicited new accounts and checked on customer credit
ratings. The supreme court held this constituted sufficient "pres-
ence" for service of process, and that an entry of summary judg-
ment which dismissed plaintiff's case based upon the statute of
limitations, was not error.
B. Fiduciary Violations
American Founders, a general life insurance corporation, sued
Colorado Management, a counseling and management corporation,
to recover $32,839 paid to the latter under a service contract to
last for ten years, and which was entered into on March 1, 1956.67
The supreme court held that Colorado Management breached the
contract after March 1, 1957, by ceasing to render services required
by the contract, and that such breach justified American Founders
65 Standard Scale & Supply Corp. v. Chappel, 16 Del. 331, 141 Ati. 191 (1928); In re Diamond
State Brewery, 22 Del. 364, 2 A.2d 254 (1938).
6836.4 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
67 Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 359 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1961).
Companion case on options, with same title is 367 P.2d 335 (Colo. 1961).
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in terminating the contract. The court found that Colorado Man-
agement had earned $6,248 of the amount paid to it, and that
American Founders was entitled to a judgment for the remainder.
Basically, this was all that was actually necessary to render a
decision. But because of the lower court's ruling of a void contract
and the various arguments and theories presented by counsel on
each side, the court produced what appears to this writer to be an
extreme amount of dictum regarding voidable contracts between
corporations having directors in common, and ratification.
Six of the eight directors of American Founders were present
at a meeting at which all approved the contract with Colorado
Management. Five directors were necessary for a quorum. Three
of the six were directors of both corporations. The court held this
did not render the contract void, but voidable, if found to be unfair,
even if there was no taint of fraud. But the contract is voidable
regardless of its fairness, the court states, if the vote of a director,
who is a director of both corporations, is necessary to form a
quorum and effectuate the transaction. Since there were only
three "disinterested" directors, the contract was voidable. 68
This voidable contract was not ratified, the court asserted, and
American Founders is not estopped from maintaining its action
because it accepted some services offered by Colorado Manage-
ment and in return made some payments. The court said, "This is
not a situation where the court is faced with a contract fully
performed by one or both of the parties. -69 (Whether a divisible
contract could ever be ratified under this reasoning is speculative.)
The court held that approval by American Founders' board of
directors of the minutes of the meeting which approved the con-
tract is not a legalization of the invalid acts recorded therein, but
only an acknowledgement that the secretary had properly recorded
the acts of the board. Further, approval by the stockholders at
their annual meeting of all lawful acts of the board for the pre-
ceding year is not ratification unless it is clearly shown that the
stockholders had full knowledge of all material facts and thereafter
knowingly accepted and approved the contract.
In Crowley v. Green,70 seller, of California, sold two pneudraulic
lifts to Provision Corporation. While Provision had the power to
buy and sell equipment, it was really not part of its business
activities. It had no use for the lifts and was insolvent to the
point where it could not have afforded the expense of the purchase.
Green was an officer and director of Provision and was in the
meat packing business at the same address as Provision. The lifts
were useful in Green's business and he had himself ordered them.
As soon as the lifts arrived, they ended up in Green's meat packing
business where they were used. Seller sued Green for the pur-
chase price, and the supreme court held that Provision was used
only as a conduit through which the lifts passed uninterruptedly
from seller to Green as the ultimate purchaser (even though the
contract was in Provision's name and. Green was not the sole owner
68 This should allay the fears of author Ernest W. Lohf, in One Year Review of Corporations,
Partnership and Agency, 37 DICTA 11, 14, note 11 (1960).
69 Colorado Management Corp. v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., supra note 67, at 669.
70 365 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1961).
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of Provision). Seller maintained the contract was in Provision's
name as a favor of Green, so that he could use a Provision truck
to transport the lifts from California to Denver. Green contended
Provision was buying the lifts for the purpose of resale.
The court avoided establishing a rule as to the "conduit" role
of Provision, which was the contracting party, and in order to
hold Green liable, the court tore into Green's defense that he was
a secondary purchaser for value. (Green contended Provision owed
him money and he set off the debt for the value of the lifts.) A
director of an insolvent corporation cannot prefer himself, said
the court, as a creditor of that corporation, and divert assets to
discharge an obligation to him to the detriment of other creditors.
He is a trustee for the creditors as well as for the corporation, and
if he does purchase corporate assets, he must account for the full
value of the property purchased to those who have the right to
demand it.7
The court made no mention of creditors other than seller, who
was awarded the full amount. Query: If other creditors had sued
on their debts, would they have been entitled to share in the sum
to be paid by Green?
C. Shifting Liability to Directors or Promoters
Guarantee Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Holzwarth72 deals with an
attempt by a corporation to divert its liability to plaintiff under a
stock repurchase agreement, onto its president and one of its direc-
tors. The supreme court held the company to its contract to repur-
chase. A letter written after the contractual rights and duties were
defined and fixed, which was signed by the president and the
director as individuals without indication of representative capacity
and which stated, "We also agree ... to repurchase the . . .shares"
was held to be the letter of the company rather than the individuals.
The letter was on a company letterhead and dealt largely with the
affairs of the company.
The fact that the shares in question were transferred to plaintiff
from the president's holdings and not from treasury stock was
considered by the court to be immaterial. The court stated, "The
company could make a lawful agreement to sell stock which it did
not then own, or it could retain its then holdings and fill the
order from shares owned by others.
'7 3
Another director of the company was held liable to plaintiff
for the damages which occurred by the company's failure to repur-
chase the stock. This defendant was director at the time the com-
pany was insolvent, and he declared and paid a dividend. The fact
that one statute74 provided civil liability and another statute75
provided criminal liability for such action was not considered by
the court to be inconsistent or in conflict.
71 For another case holding the surviving directors of a defunct corporation as trustees for the
creditors and stockholders with a fiduciary relationship which precludes the directors from acquiring
any interest in corporate assets, other than as trustees, see Whatley v. Wood, 366 P.2d 570 (Cola.
1961).
72 366 P.2d 377 (Colo. 1961).
73 Id. at 382.
74 Colo. Rev. Stat. 31-2-12 (1953).
75 Colo. Rev. Stat. 72-2-3 (1953).
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Quaker Hill, Inc. v. Parr"8 supports the general rule that pro-
moters of a corporation are personally liable on their contracts,
even though made on behalf of a corporation to be formed, except
where the contracting party agrees to look to the corporation and
not to the promoters for payment. Supporting the use of the ex-
ception to the general rule in this case was the fact that Quaker
Hill, the plaintiff, acting through its agent, was well aware that
the corporation was not formed, but, nevertheless, urged that the
contract be made in the name of the proposed corporation. Not
only were the defendants not promoters of a corporation at the
time of the contract, the court stated, but the agent for the plaintiff
even suggested the name to be used for the then non-existent
corporation.
III. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Rights Upon Dissolution and After Termination
Davis v. Davis77 is concerned with the best method for distribu-
tion of partnership property upon dissolution of the partnership.
The supreme court feels that when the partners cannot agree78 and
dissolution and winding up of the partnership is under the auspices
of the court, then the court has discretion to provide either for divi-
sion or sale of the property, depending upon the circumstances
of each case. The court also states that it is the general rule that
in an action for a partnership accounting and dissolution, the entire
partnership property will be converted to cash.
7 9
Quelland and Roy 0 became partners in 1952. Together they
leased real estate and constructed and operated a coffee shop and
cocktail lounge on the premises. Later, they orally dissolved the
partnership and Roy took over the business. He orally agreed to
pay "Quelland 1/4 percent of the gross sales of all products sold
on the premises '8 1 for the duration of the lease. Roy then built a
"tap room" and "dining room" on the premises with his own money.
The issue was whether Quelland was entitled to his percentage of
76 364 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1961).
77 366 P.2d 857 (Colo. 1961).
78 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-38(1) (1953). "When dissolution is caused . . . each partner . . . un-
less otherwise agreed, may have the partnership property applied to discharge its liabilities, and the
surplus applied to pay in cash the net amount owing to the respective partners."
79 Some dictum concerning joint or joint and several liability of partners was deleted from the
opinion prior to its final publication.
80 Quelland v. Roy, 365 P.2d 899 (Colo. 1961).
81 Id. at 899.
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gross sales only from the two rooms built prior to dissolution
(which percentages were always paid) or also from the two rooms
built after dissolution.
The lower court approved a motion to dismiss on behalf of
Roy after Quelland put on his evidence, and this was affirmed by
the supreme court which held that a partner leaving the business
is only entitled to a return on the use of his capital by the continu-
ing partner in the absence of an express agreement. He is not
entitled to earnings on new capital to which he did not contribute.
One point was not made clear by the court. A sub-tenant had
taken over operation of the "dining room" (built after dissolution)
and the "coffee shop" (built prior to dissolution). The sub-tenant
was paying the 13/4 percent of gross sales on food sold in both
rooms to Quelland "in accordance with Roy's agreement. '8 2 Is Quel-
land still entitled to a percent of gross sales on food sold in the
"dining room"?
Roy, by counter-claim, sought to become owner of the entire
lease on the real estate. The court held Quelland could only be
divested of his interest as a tenant in common by operation of law
or by assignment of his interest. There was no written assignment
as provided by the statute of frauds, and the evidence showed that.
up to the time of litigation, Quelland had always been considered
a joint lessee. What was not mentioned in the decision is that
under the Uniform Partnership Act, such assignment would be by
operation of law as to old and new creditors, even if no assignment
were made.a3
B. Partnership Property - Limited Partnership
Wise v. Nu-Tone Products Co. 84 affirms the general rule that
unless the contrary intent appears, property acquired with partner-
ship funds is partnership property, 5 and this presumption is not
negated merely because the property is placed in the name of one
of the individual members of the partnership.8 6
The interesting aspect is that this was a limited partnership and
"the Uniform Limited Partnership Act does not have a comparable
or parallel statutory provision"87 to the Uniform Partnership Act 8
as to purchase of property with partnership funds. The supreme
court based its decision on Colo. Rev. Stat. §104-2-9 (1953) which
provides that "in any case not provided for in this article, the rules
of law and equity, including the law merchant, shall govern."
C. Employee v. Partners
In Pospicil v. Hammers,89 a car salesman sued for unpaid
commissions. The employer was originally an individual, later, a
partnership, and last, a corporation. The salesman sued the in-
82 Id. at 900.
83 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-41(3) (1953). "When any partner retires . . . and the business of the
dissolved partnership is continued . . . with the consent of the retired partners . . . but without any
assignment of his right in partnership property, rights of creditors of the dissolved partnership and
of the creditors of the person . . . continuing the business shall be as if such assignment had been
made."
84 367 P.2d 346 (Colo. 1961).
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-8 (1953).
86 Oswald v. Down, 143 Colo. 487, 354 P.2d 505 (1960).
87 Supra note 84 at 349.
88 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 104-1-8 (1953).
89 365 P.2d 228 (Colo. 1961).
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dividual, the three partners, and the corporation. Judgment was
entered in the lower court against the defendants, and each of
them for $819. The corporation liability for the entire amount of
unpaid commissions was approved by the supreme court, but not
the judgment against the individual or the partners. The reasoning
of the court was that plaintiff failed to establish when the individ-
ual's liability terminated or when that of the partnership began,
and the amount of unpaid commissions earned under each separate
employer. The court pointed out that the individual and the
members of the partnership could not have been held responsible
for any commissions earned by plaintiff following his employment
by the corporation.
D. Joint Ventures
While not stated in specific terms, Griffith v. Cooper9" appears
to support the general rule that joint ventures will be governed
by the law of partnership. Thus, when four joint venturers agree
to share profits equally (and apparently nothing is stated as to
sharing of losses) the losses are shared equally.
The joint venturers were engaged in construction of sixteen
homes. Three of them, as plaintiffs, sought an accounting. Each
had received advance withdrawals totaling $11,000. The master's
report was unfavorable to them and in favor of defendant Griffith
for losses of $17,000. The trial court ignored the master's report
and left the parties where they were before the accounting. On
appeal by defendant Griffith, the plaintiffs contended they were
independent contractors rather than joint venturers and thus
entitled to retain the benefits received without having to share
the losses. The supreme court held they were bound by the account-
ing and by their admissions in the trial court that they were joint
venturers and must therefore contribute to Griffith for their propor-
tionate share of the total loss.
90 359 P.2d 360 (Colo. 1961).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.*
During 19611 the Colorado Supreme Court decided over fifty
cases dealing with criminal law and procedure, includink cases
concerned with violations of municipal ordinances.2 In addition, the
1961 Colorado legislature enacted a dozen statutes on criminal
matters.3
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Municipal Power to Enact Penal Ordinances
Pre-1961 Colorado cases had held that, in the absence of legis-
lation enlarging municipal power to enact penal ordinances, (1) a
home-rule city has no power to enact a penal ordinance dealing
with a matter of statewide concern which is already covered by
a counterpart state statute;4 and (2) a "statutory" municipality
(i.e., one without home rule), besides being subject to the above
limitation applicable to home-rule cities, also lacks the power to
enact an ordinance even on a matter of local concern, if there is a
state statute on the matter so complete that the state may be said
to have pre-empted the field. 5 A 1961 case re-enforced this last
straight-jacket proposition, holding that a statutory city has no
power to punish reckless driving6-a matter which was earlier held
to be of local concern.
7
In 1961 the process continued, at a reduced rate, of pigeon-holing
various types of forbidden conduct into the statewide category and
the local category. Thus vagrancy was held to be a matter of local
concern.' But two important events occurred during the year to
diminish the importance of these pigeon holes. First, a Colorado
case, Woolverton v. Denver,9 recognized that conduct is not neces-
sarily purely local or exclusively statewide; that some types of
conduct have both statewide and local implications; and that with
such types the home-rule city has power if the state does not forbid
it. Second, the 1961 Colorado legislature, in response to a 1959 invi-
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Low.
I The cases discussed in this article are found in 358 P.2d No. 2 through 367 P.2d, except for
Gallegos v. People, 358 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960), discussed in the review of 1960 cases, 38 DICTA 65
(1961).
2 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), as explained by Geer v. Alaniz,
138 Colo. 177, 331 P.2d 260 (1958), holds that a municipal penal ordinance of a home-rule city
creates a crime, not a civil wrong, if either (a) there exists a counterpart state statute punishing
the same conduct or (b) the ordinance authorizes imprisonment as punishment. The penal ordinance
of a "statutory" municipality (i.e., one without home rule) doubtless is also a crime if there is a
counterpart state statute or the ordinance authorizes imprisonment.
3 In this article the author departs from his practice of prior years by including herein the 1961
legislative developments in the field of criminal law and procedure.
4 Canon City v. Merris, supra note 2.
5 Aurora v. Mitchell, 144 Colo. 526, 357 P.2d 923 (1960), discussed by the author of this article
in 38 DICTA 6
5
,at 66 (1961).
6 Vanatto v. Steamboat Springs, 361 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1961).
7 Retallick v. Colorado Springs, 142 Colo. 214, 351 P.2d 884 (1960) (since the matter is local,
a home-rule city has power to enact an ordinance punishing reckless and careless driving).
8 Dominguez v. Denver, 363 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961) (a home-rule city has power to punish
vagrancy).
9 361 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1961) (a home-rule city has power to punish gambling).
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
tation by the Colorado Supreme Court, 0 passed a statute authoriz-
ing municipalities (statutory as well as home-rule) to enact penal
ordinances punishing most traffic offenses committed within their
municipal borders."
As to the first of these events, the Colorado Supreme Court in
Woolverton v. Denver held that gambling (an offense punishable
by a Denver ordinance with a maximum punishment of ninety days
in jail and $300 fine, and punishable more lightly by a state statute
with a maximum punishment of $150 fine) is a matter of local as
well as statewide concern; and, since the state legislature has not
forbidden municipalities to deal with gambling (and in fact has
affirmatively consented" to their doing so), the city has power to
punish the offense of gambling.'3 The Woolverton case involved
gambling in a home-rule city; but its rule probably would apply
also to gambling in a statutory city or town because the state legis-
lature has affirmatively invited both types of municipalities to
regulate gambling. Woolverton is not altogether clear, for purposes
of home-rule city regulation of matters in the partly-local-partly-
statewide category, whether it is enough that the legislature has
not forbidden municipal regulation, or whether an affirmative
legislative consent to regulation is also required.
The second event-the 1961 statute14 expressly authorizing both
home-rule cities and statutory municipalities 5 to enact penal
ordinances punishing many traffic offenses which are also punish-
able by state statutes-is a continuation of the trend, disclosed in
Woolverton, toward recognition of concurrent power of state and
municipalities over minor offenses committed within municipal
boundaries. Three traffic offenses are expressly excepted by the
statute from the exercise of municipal power and left solely in the
hands of the state. These are driving under the influence, driving
an unregistered car or after license revocation or suspension, and
hit-and-run driving. Other traffic matters may be regulated by
municipalities. An ordinance punishing a traffic offense need not
be worded exactly like the statute and need not provide exactly
the same punishment. 16 The statute further contains provision for-
bidding state prosecution of a traffic violation after a municipal
court conviction of the offense on a guilty or not-guilty plea. Doubt-
less, though the statute does not say so, the converse is true that
10 Davis v. Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959), invited the Colorado legislature to enact
legislation delegating to home-rule cities concurrent power to enact penal ordinances dealing with
matters which are of both statewide and local concern.
11 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 66, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-6, 7 (1953).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-32-1 (52) (1953), empowering home-rule and statutory cities and towns
"to suppress gaming and gambling houses."
13 Woolverton v. Denver, supra note 9. The opinion of Doyle, J., concurred in by Day, Sutton
and McWilliams, JJ., spoke in terms of black and white (matters exclusively local or exclusively
statewide) and gray (partaking of both local and statewide qualities), with gambling falling in
the gray area. The ather three justices rejected the gray category in favor of pure black and pure
white; but Moore, J., concurring, thought that gambling is b ack (purely local) whereas Hall, C.J.,
and Frantz, J., dissented on the ground that gambling is white (exclusively statewide).
14 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 66, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-6, 7 (1953).
15 The 1961 statute authorizes the adoption of traffic regulations by "all local municipal author-
ities." i.e., by both home-rule and statutory cities and towns.
16 Thus the 1961 statute amends Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-6 (1953) by deleting the narrow former
language permitting municipalities to adopt traific regulations "not in conflict" with state traffic
statutes and by substituting broader language allowing them to adopt traffic regulations "which
cover the same subject matter" as the state traffic statutes.
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a state conviction bars municipal prosecution for the same traffic
offense.'7
Assume that, in spite of the above-described expansions of
municipal power, a municipality nevertheless lacks the power to
enact a penal ordinance punishing certain conduct, but that, in
spite of this lack, the municipality, having enacted a void ordinance,
charges a defendant with violating the ordinance and convicts him
thereof and collects a fine. Can the defendant, on learning of the
mistake, thereafter recover the fine he paid under a mistake of
law? A 1961 case holds that he cannot.18
B. Particular Crimes
1. Murder - Premeditation and Deliberation. - If the defendant
without justification or excuse intentionally kills his victim, he is
guilty of murder; but first degree murder under the Colorado
statute 9 requires not just an intent to kill ("willfulness"), but pre-
meditation and deliberation besides. It is difficult to ascribe any
exact meaning to these vague words.20 Perhaps it may be said that
premeditation involves asking oneself the question, "Shall I kill
him?"; willfulness involves the answer, "Yes, I shall"; and deliber-
ation involves the further thought: "But if I do, what are the
consequences? Well, I'll do it anyway." It is often said that each of
these three separate thoughts requires very little time. A 1961 case
upheld the trial court's instruction, objected to by the defendant,
to the effect that the three thoughts require only enough time "for
one thought to follow another."'21 Another case held that premedita-
tion, as well as the intent to kill, may be inferred from the defend-
17 The Woolveron case itself, 361 P.2d 982, 990, recognizes, in a dictum, that the municipality,
being a creature of the state, is not, for double jeopardy purposes, a separate sovereign from its
creator the state. See also Kneier, Prosecution Under Stote Low And Municipal Ordinance As Double
Jeopardy, 16 Cornell L.Q. 201 (1931), and Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 267, 281, 283 (1958).
18 Prilliman v. Canon City, 360 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1961) (defendant, convicted and fined in
municipal court for drunken driving before the Merris case held that there is no municipal power
over drunk driving, cannot recover back the amount of his fine, for there can be no restitution
for money voluntarily paid under mistake of law concerning the constitutionality of an ordinance).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 (1953). "[Wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing" is first-degree
murder.
20 Cardozo, Law and Literature and Other Essays, 96-101 (1931).
21 Hammil v. People, 361 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1961). Frantz, J., dissented on the ground that the
instruction requiring only enough time "for one thought to follow another" was improper in the
setting of this case because the evidence had shown that the defendant was particularly slow-
witted. On principle, of course, the jury should be instructed in the case of a mentally-retarded
defendant not only that the defendant needs a little time to premeditate and deliberate, but also
that he should have capacity to do so. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1945) (especially
dissent by Frankfurter, J.), discussed at 34 Calif. L. Rev. 625 (1946), 46 Colum. L. Rev. 1005 (1946),
99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267 (1950), 56 Yale L.J. 959 (1947).
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ant's intentional use of a deadly weapon, in a deadly way, upon
the body of his victim. 22 It would seem, however, that, although an
intent to kill may be properly inferred from such conduct, the fact
that this intent was premeditated and deliberate ought to require
something further in the way of evidence concerning the circum-
stances surrounding the delivery of the lethal blow.
23
2. Robbery. - A 1961 case stated that robbery, defined by Colo-
rado statute as "the felonious and violent taking of money, goods
or other valuable thing from the person of another by force or
intimidation,"24 is not a crime requiring a specific intent, so that
defendant's proffered evidence of his mental incapacity to form a
specific intent to rob is irrelevant. 25 But the word "felonious" in the
definition of robbery requires a specific intent, the same specific
intent to steal (to deprive the owner of his property) which larceny
requires. Robbery is nothing more than larceny-plus, i.e., with all
the elements of larceny, plus (a) a taking from the person or pres-
ence of the victim, (b) done by force or intimidation.26 Of course,
one must be pretty far gone mentally to be placed in the category
in which, even though he is not insane, he lacks the capacity to
intend to steal, when, as in the case under discussion, he enters a
hotel lobby with a hammer hidden in his coat, hits the desk clerk
several lethal blows with the hammer and a pipe wrench, and then
thoughtfully empties the cash register, cash drawer and change
bowl before leaving the premises with his pockets full of money.
3. Forgery. - A borrower, in order to induce a bank to make
him a loan, wrote out and signed four invoices which stated that
he had sold goods to and performed services for X, for which X
owed him $2,000. In fact, he had never delivered such goods or
performed such services for X, who was a non-existent person. The
borrower assigned the false invoices to the bank with intent to
defraud. On the strength of these invoices, the bank lent him money,
which he never repaid. The bank had an insurance policy insuring
it against losses caused by accepting documents with the "forged"
signature of a maker, drawer, endorser or assignor. The Colorado
Supreme Court properly held that the bank's loss was not covered
by the forgery insurance, for, whatever his crimes, the borrower
did not commit forgery.27 The borrower wrote out and signed a
genuine writing containing lies and by obtaining the bank's money
he was no doubt guilty of false pretenses, but he was not guilty of
forgery. Thus it is sometimes said that "a forgery tells not merely
a lie but a lie about itself."
22 Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961).
23 Thus in People v. Biornsen, 79 Cal.App.2d 519, 180 P.2d 443 (1947), there was evidence that
the defendant had "thoughtfully taken the precaution" of taking several cartridges with him before
shooting the victim twice with a single-barreled shotgun. The court said, "We think these circum.
stances sufficiently supply the necessary proof of premeditation, deliberation and malice" to support
a conviction for first-degree murdcr.
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-1 (1953).
2 Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 243 (1962),
reversing the conviction of robbery on other grounds, however. Dayle, J., concurring, properly
points out that nothing is clearer than that robbery is a specific-intent crime.
26 Perkins, Criminal Low, 236-37 (1957): "The word 'felonious' [in the usual definition of
robbery] means a taking with intent to steal;" and "robbery is larceny plus certain circumstances
of aggravation."
27 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 364 P.2d 202 (Colo. 1961), following the
famous Colorado case, DeRose v. People, 64 Colo. 332, 171 Pac. 359, 1918C L.R.A. 1193 (1918) (an
employee who writes out and signs a time sheet showing he has worked 40 hours when he in
fact has worked but 30, is not guilty of forgery even though he intends to defraud his employer).
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4. Possession of Narcotics. - In Colorado, as in other jurisdic-
tions, it is a crime to "possess" narcotics. 2 The statute does not say
"knowingly possess." In civil law, as first year students of the law
of personal property know, there may be such a thing as unconscious
possession, i.e., possession of an article of whose existence or of
whose nature the possessor is unaware, if he is in possession of
the place wherein the article lies.2 9 But in criminal law unconscious
possession ought not to do, and the Colorado courts properly require
that, for the crime of narcotics possession, the defendant must both
(a) know of the presence of the forbidden article and (b) know
that the article is a narcotic drug.
30
5. Larceny by Bailee. - An accountant and tax consultant ad-
vised a taxpayer, after making out his return, that he owed $1250
federal income taxes. The taxpayer gave the accountant his check
for $1250, payable to the accountant, with which to pay the taxes
to the federal government. The accountant, however, filed a return
showing that the taxpayer had overpaid his tax. Then the accountant
deposited the check in his checking account and withdrew $1200
for his private purposes. In most other states a bailee or agent who
is handed money by his bailor or principal to deal with according to
the bailment or agency agreement is guilty of embezzlement if he
fraudulently converts the money to his own use, but in Colorado
he is guilty of the crime of "larceny by bailee, ' ' 31 a crime which
is considered neither embezzlement nor larceny.
6. Constitutional Issues. - One 1961 case involved the constitu-
tionality of the Colorado sex offenders act,32 upholding the one-day-
to-life sentence feature of the act against the contention that, by
providing different penalties depending upon whether the trial
court decides to use the act or not, the act denies the equal pro-
tection of the laws, and against the contention that the act confers
judicial power on the parole board (charged with the task of
determining when to release the offender from the institution).
33
Another case, after construing Denver's vagrancy ordinance, upheld
the constitutionality of that hard-to-define offense.34 Still another
case upset a conviction for driving after license suspension because
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-6-2, 20 (1953).
29 Brown, Personal Property 22 (2d ed. 1955).
30 Mickens v. People, 365 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1961) (such a definition held to be "a fair exposition
of the low's contemplation of 'possession' and eminently fair to the defendant"); Duran v. People,
360 P.2d 132 (Cole. 1961). A leading case is State v. Cox, 91 Ore. 518, 179 Pac. 575 (1919) (hotel
porter carrying suitcase containing liquor not guilty of possessing liquor in absence of knowledge
of contents of baggage).
Model Penal Code, § 2.01(4) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), even more accurately provides that
possession of contraband can give rise to criminal liability only if the possessor knowingly procured
or knowingly received the forbidden article or was aware of his control of it for so long a time
that he could have gotten rid of it.
31 Fing v. People, 360 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1961) (evidence, set forth in the text, supports conviction
of larceny by bailee).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-19-1 to 39-19-9 (1953), permits the. trial judge, in his discretion, to
sentence anyone convicted of certain sex crimes (including indecent liberties) to a state instiution
for a one-day-to-life term, instead of sentencing him according to the provisions of the statute
defining and punishing the crime. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2.32 provides for a ten year maximum
term for the crime of taking indecent liberties with a child.
33 Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961) (one-day-to-life sentence imposed for taking
indecent liberties).
34 Dominguez v. Denver, 363 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961) (vagrancy ordinance construed so as to
require an explanation of his conduct from one who by the commission of an overt act has aroused
a reasonable suspicion of crime; defendant, at 3 a.m., was seen running away from a car, which
had a broken window, and dropping a frozen chicken en route. When asked by police why he




the underlying statute by whose authority the license was suspended
(Colorado's driver safety responsibility law) was unconstitutional.35
7. Statutory Changes. - The 1961 Colorado legislature created
two new crimes - shoplifting36 and misuse of a party-line tele-
phone.37 It extended the narcotics law to punish some new forms




1. Attempt. - A Colorado case holds that one is not guilty of
embezzlement.where, being in possession of his employer's valueless
piece of paper (a forged check) by virtue of his employment, he
fraudulently converts it to his own use believing it to be a genuine
check. 41 Although not an issue in the case 4 2 this fact situation raises
the interesting question whether it is attempted larceny, attemped
embezzlement, attempted false pretenses or attempted receiving
(insofar as these are crimes) 43 for one to steal, embezzle, obtain
by false pretenses or receive property which he believes to be
genuine and therefore valuable but which in fact is forged and
worthless. It is submitted that the answer should be yes, i.e., that
the impossibility of committing the completed crime does not nega-
tive the attempt.
44
. 2. Parties: Accomplices. - The lookout who aids the burglar
and the driver of the get-away car who assists the robber are of
course accomplices of the burglar or robber; they are working
together on the same side of the crime. A harder question is involved
when the two are working at opposite ends of the crime, e.g., bribe-
35 People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 252 (1962).
36 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 106, adding Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-30 et seq., defining shoplifting
as wilfully and unlawfully taking possession of merchandise displayed in a store, with intent to
feloniously convert the same without paying the purchase price. Concealment of unpurchosed
merchandise is prima facie evidence of this intent. Maximum punishment is five years in the
aenitentiary for shoplifting of merchandise worth more than $100; when the merchandise is worth
ss than $100, the maximum punishment is six months jail sentence and $300 fine for the first
offense, one year in jail and $500 fine for the second offense, and five years in the penitentiary
for the third offense. The statute also protects merchants against civil liability for slander, false
arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution by questioning persons reasonably suspected
of shoplifting.
37 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 105, provides for a punishment of 90 days in jail and $1,000
fine for wilfully refusing to yield a party line when informed of the need for an emergency call
to a fire or police department or for medical aid or ambulance service and provides for a 10 day
imprisonment and $100 fine maximum for falsely stating that an emergency exists in order to
obtain the use of a party line.
38 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 117, adding Colo. Rev. Stat. § 48-6-20(6), punishes as a mis-
demeanor (two years in jail maximum) certain unlawful conduct concerning narcotic drugs by
apothecaries, doctors, dentists and veterinarians.
39 Col Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 109, amended Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-18-1 (1953) by eliminating
the long list of types of injury and types of property covered by the crime and inserting simply
"destroy, damage or in any manner injure the real or personal property belonging to another."
The new statute also alters somewhat the penalties for malicious mischief.
40 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 107, amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-9-16, 17, 18, 21 (1953), con-
cerning the knowing importation, exhibition, sale, possession and mailing of obscene literature.
The amended statute requires that the defendant knowingly deal with obscenity, apparently to
conform to the due process requirement laid down by th United States Supreme Court in Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (ordinance punishing possession of obscene book though without
knowledge of its contents violates fourteenth amendment due process, since it inhibits free expression
because bookseller cannot safely sell books wthout first studying them).
41 Burns v. People, 360 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1961).
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-16 (1953), defining and punishing embezzlement, does not punish
attempted embezzlement, and Colorado, unlike most (perhaps all) other states, lacks a general
attempt statute.
43 Colo. Rev. Stot. § 40-14-2 lSupp. 1960). makes attempted false pretenses a crime; but
attempted larceny and attempted receiving, as well as attempted embezzlement, seem not to be
Colorado crimes. This is a glaring loop-hole in the criminal low which should be plugged by a
general statute punishing attempts to commit crimes.
44 Thus it is attempted larceny for one, withr intent to steal, to pu
t 
his hand into an empty
pocket or cash drawer. Perkins, Criminal Law 492 (1957). It is attempted receiving stolen property
for one to receive property he believes to be stolen but which is not in fact stolen. People v. Rojas,
358 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1961).
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giver and bribe-taker, statutory rapist and underage girl, liquor-
seller and liquor-buyer, abortionist and expectant mother, receiver
and thief. Are the bribe-taker, underage girl, liquor purchaser,
expectant mother and thief accomplices in the other's criminal
venture? A 1961 Colorado case settled a conflict in the Colorado
law by following the majority rule that a thief is not an accom-
plice of the receiver (for purposes of the requirement that one
accomplice's testimony against the other should be viewed with
caution),45 the test as to an accomplice being whether he could be
charged with the same offense as the criminal himself.
46
3. Parties: Withdrawal. - A, after agreeing with B to burglarize
X's restaurant in a town some miles away, drives B there; after
investigating the restaurant, however, they decide it is too risky.
A lets B out of the car and drives off. B then, without A's knowledge,
robs Y, proprietor of another restaurant in the same town. There-
after B, hitchhiking out of town with the loot from the robbery,
is picked up by A, who by happy coincidence drives by at the right
moment. Is A guilty of robbery of Y? The Colorado court held no,
for, having voluntarily withdrawn from the original conspiracy, he
was not responsible for what his erstwhile co-conspirator thereafter
did.47 This seems a correct view of the law; A would not be guilty,
even though B had robbed X instead of Y, if A by words or conduct
notified B of his withdrawal "before the act in question has become
so imminent that its avoidance is practically out of the question. '48
4. Mental Deficiency Short of Insanity. - A defendant's mental
defect which does not amount to insanity may negative the specific
intent which a particular crime may require. 49 This proposition was
recognized in a 1961 case which, however, held that neither felony
murder (unintended killing in the commission of a felony) nor
robbery was a crime requiring a specific intent. The court was




A. Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
The big news of 1961 in the area of criminal procedure was
the adoption, by the Colorado Supreme Court, effective November
1, 1961, of the new Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, based
45 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961), following Newman v. People, 55 Colo. 374, 135
Pac. 460 (1913), and overruling Moynahan v. People, 63 Colo. 433, 167 Pac. 1175 (1917).
It is generally held that the underage girl and the pregnant lady are victims rather than
accomplices, and that a liquor-buyer is not an accomplice of a liquor-seller because the legislature
carefully made liquor-selling, but not liquor-buying a crime.
46 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698, 700 (Cola. 1961). This test may not be altogether workable,
for whether one can be charged with the same crime depends on whether he is an accomplice, and
whether he is an accomplice (by the test) depends on whether he can be charged with the same crime.
47 Johnson v. People, 358 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1961) (since the jury might have found, on the
evidence, the facts to be true, the court committed reversible error in not instructing the jury, on
its own motion, that this would amount to a withdrawal which would relieve A from liability for
the robbery committed by B; Doyle, J., dissented on the ground that A requested no such instruction).
48 Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 AtI. 313 (1926) (A and B committed a robbery,
after which A was captured while B fled; B shot a pursuing policeman to death; held, A is liable
for murder, in spite of the contention that he withdrew at the moment of capture).
49 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-1 (Supp. 1960) provides that "evidence of mental condition may be
offered in a proper case as bearing on the capacity of the accused to form the specific intent
essential to constitute a crime," although no insanity plea has been made. Even without such a
statute, this ought to be the law.
50 Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961), discussed supra note 25 and text. The court did
hold, however, that the mental defect was a factor for the jury to consider in fixing punishment for
first-degree murder at life or death.
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upon, but not slavishly imitating, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Rules are commented upon at length, by members
of the committee which drafted them, in the fall, 1961, symposium
issue of the Rocky Mountain Law Review.51 Generally speaking,
the Rules do not greatly change pre-existing Colorado criminal
procedure,52 though they do make certain, without making changes,
some matters which formerly were vague.53 The principal innova-
tions made by the Rules are these: in some circumstances a
summons, instead of an arrest warrant, may be used; 54 the miscel-
laneous array of pretrial defense motions and pleas (the plea in
abatement, plea in bar, motion to quash and demurrer) are abol-
ished, and a simple motion to dismiss or grant appropriate relief
is substituted; 55 pretrial discovery and inspection by the defendant
of the prosecution's evidence is provided for to a limited degree; 56
no time limitation applies in the case of a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence;57  a new post-conviction
remedy, without limitation of time, for prisoners in custody under
criminal sentence is created for exceptional cases of unconstitutional
or otherwise seriously defective convictions; 58 the requirement of
abstracts of the record and assignments of error for appellate re-
view on writ of error is abolished; 59 a new provision on search
warrants permits a warrant to search for and seize evidentiary
material as well as the fruits of or instruments of crime, and creates
a new pretrial motion to surpress evidence obtained by an un-
reasonable search and seizure;60 assignment of counsel is mandatory
for indigents in all felony cases, unless the defendant refuses
counsel;61 and the archaic term-of-court concept of time limitations
on criminal procedural steps is abolished.6 2
A problem exists, in the relatively few areas of conflict be-
tween the pre-existing statutory procedural provision and the new
51 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. No. 1 (1961).
52 Several Colorado procedural "pets" have been retained even though they differ from the
procedure provided for in the Federal Rules,
1. The information is the normal method of accusation,
2. The names of witnesses are endorsed on the information or indictment.
3. The direct filing of the information without a preliminory examinotion is allowed.
4. The special insanity plea is required to raise that defense.
5. The defendant alone may waive jury trial.
6. The attorneys conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors.
7. Written instructions are used, and they are given before the summing up.
8. The trial court must not comment on the evidence.
9. There is no appellate review of on issue not raised by a motion for new trial or motion in
arrest of judgment.
53 E.g., the duty of one who arrests with a warrant to take the arrested person "without
unnecessary delay" before a justice of the peace; and, if without a warrant, to do so "within a
reasonable time" (Colo. R. Crim. P. 5(a) ); exactly what happens at the preliminary examination
(Cola. R. Crim. P. 5(d) ); the extent to which a defendant is entitled to examine a prosecution
witness statement to the police for use in cross-examination of the witness (Colo. R. Crim. P.
16 (b), (c), (d) ).
54 Colo. R. Crim. P. 4, 9.
55 Colo. R. Crim. P. 12.
56 Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(a), permitting defendant on court order to inspect and copy or photograph
designated books, documents or tangible objects "obtained from or belonging to the defendant or
obtained from others by seizure or by process" if items thus sought may be material to his defense.
57 Colo. R. Crim. P. 33.
58 Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(b), covering an area of relief formerly dealt with by Colorado's habeas
corpus but going somewhat tyand the scope of that inadequate remedy, which has been construed
so narrowly in Colorado. Under Rule 35 (b) the defendant moves in the court which tried him to
vacate, set aside or correct his sentence.
59 Colo. R. Crim. P. 39(c), providing also that the procedure concerning briefs and records in
criminal cases on error shall be the some as in civil cases.
60 Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.
61 Colo. R. Crim. P. 44.
62 Colo. R. Crim. P. 45(c). This fundamental policy change necessitated changes in the time
allowed for motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment (Rules 33, 34) and the time beyond
which an accused person can no longer be prosecuted (Rule 48 (b) ), matters which formerly were
governed by the term-of.court concept of time.
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procedural rule, as to which should govern, the statute or the rule.
The 1960 enabling act,63 authorizing the Colorado Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of criminal procedure, limits the scope of the
rules to procedural (i.e., excluding substantive)64 matters, and it
contains no provision, like that found in the enabling act for the
civil rules,65 that the procedural rules shall operate to repeal con-
flicting procedural statutes. This gives rise to two questions: (1)
Do the procedural provisions in the Rules operate to repeal con-
flicting procedural statutes? (2) What matters covered by the
rules are procedural and what matters are substantive?"6
(1) I believe that the legislature's sweeping provision in the
1960 enabling act empowering the supreme court to promulgate
rules "with respect to any or all proceedings in all criminal cases"
necessarily implies, as a matter of the intent of the legislature,
that the Rules when promulgated will repeal conflicting statutes.
Furthermore, aside from the matter of legislative intent, there is
the sound principle, recognized by the Colorado Supreme Court long
ago, 67 that the courts, not the legislature, are the final authority
on what procedural rules are to be applied in the courts as part
of the tripartite division of governmental, power among the execu-
tive, judicial and legislative branches.
68
(2) I believe that nothing in the new Rules can be held to be
substantive, rather than procedural, law. 9 Just because a matter
is important does not mean that it is substantive; just because a
procedural change is big does not make it a substantive change.
Insofar as the new Colorado Rules have altered the former statu-
tory law of criminal procedure, they may have made "substantial"
procedural changes but they have not made "substantive" changes.
7t
The new Rules provide that the trial court must provide counsel
for indigent defendants in all felony cases, whereas the old statu-
tory law was that the court may do so. The new Rules provide
for dismissal of the prosecution if a year passes after the filing
of the indictment or information without bringing the defendant
to trial; the old statutory law provided for this dismissal after
two terms of court, which might be more or less than a year. These
changes are no doubt important, with important consequences, but
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-2-34 (Supp. 1960).
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-2-8 (1953).
65 Not only has the legislature in the enabling act thus impliedly limited the power of the
supreme court to exclude substantive matters, but doubtless in addition the legislature could not
delegate its power to promulgate general rules of substantive law to the courts.
66 For light on the answers to these questions, I am indebted to my colleague Professor Douglas
H. Parker, of the University of Colorado School of Law, who has prepared a scholarly manuscript,
not yet published, entitled Some Illusory Pitfalls: The Repealing Effect of the Colorado Criminal
Rules, Procedurol Law versus Substantive Law, and the Ex Post Facto Limitation.
67 Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931) (" ... the power to make rules of
procedure is our [the supreme court's] constitutional right"), discussed in McCormick, Legislature
and Supreme Court Clash on Rule-Making Power in Colorado, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 664 (1933).
68 See Levin and Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making, 107 U. Pa. I. Rev. 1
(1958).
69 Parker, supra note 66, discussing the terms "substantive" and "procedural," relates these
words to criminal law as follows: "Thus, in the field of criminal law, the substantive criminal law
is concerned with the elements of the various crimes (from murder down to disturbance), as contained
in their definitions, and with the punishments which may be awarded for their violations, plus
those broader matters called "general principles" of criminal law, which, because they are applicable
to several or many or all crimes (e.g., attempt, conspiracy, self-defense, insanity) do not appear
in the definitions of the various crimes. The criminal procedural law, on the other hand, concerns
the steps taken, from arrest through trial and appellate review to post-conviction remedies, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused person."
70 Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 35, 37, authorizing one party in civil
action to conduct a physical or mental examination of opposite party in appropriate cases, are
not invalid as substantive rules; "substantive" does not mean "important" or "substantial").
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they are nonetheless procedural changes, not substantive changes.
It has been suggested that the Colorado legislature (a) should
enact the Rules as legislative law and (b) should expressly, "by
the numbers," repeal those statutes still on the books which are
inconsistent with the Rules.' Those who believe in the supremacy
of the judiciary over the legislature in the area of court procedure
might not approve of the first suggestion on the ground that it is
unnecessary and seems to acknowledge the supremacy of the
legislature in the procedural field and might call for legislative
enactment of any subsequent amendments to the Rules. But the
second suggestion is sound, for, whether absolutely necessary or
not, it would certainly serve to eliminate confusion.
B. Declaratory Judgment
One who wishes to engage in conduct which a statute or
ordinance of questionable validity purports to punish as a crime
may prudently wish to test its validity before he undertakes to
violate its terms, rather than engage in the forbidden conduct and
later, when prosecuted, defend on the ground of the invalidity of
the law. A 1960 Colorado case allowed the use of a declaratory
judgment fur such a purpose.72 This view seems right both as a
matter of interpreting the language of the declaratory judgment
law73 (i.e., what the law is) and as a matter of what the law ought
to be. But a 1961 Colorado case, without referring to the 1960 case,
held that a declaratory judgment cannot be used for such a pur-
pose; 74 one must instead wait and raise the invalidity issue when
prosecuted for violating the statute or ordinance.
C. Information
1. Formc. - A 1961 Colorado event of some importance is the
publication of the 1961 revision of Criminal Informations and Forms
Annotated," by the late Max D. Melville, published by the Office of
the District Attorney, Denver, Colorado. The Appendix of Forms to
the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure refers to the Melville
forms for guidai.ce in charging particular crimes, from "Abortion"
to "Violations of Motor Vehicle Law." The Appendix makes one
suggested change to the Melville forms which should serve a useful
purpose: instead of unhelpfully concluding, in the traditionally
vague way, "contrary to the form of the statute in such case made
and provided, and against the peace" etc., the form concludes, "in
violation of C.R.S. 1953, §-, and against the peace" etc.
2. Allegations. - An information charging a crime committed
by two co-defendants, one of whom was in fact a principal and the
other an accessory, need not specify that a particular defendant
is principal or accessory, but can properly remain silent as to
71 A subcommittee of the Colorado Bar Association's Criminal Low Committee is charged with
preparing a list of such statutes for submission to the 1963 legislature.
72 Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery, 144 Colo. 448, 356 P.2d 884 (1960), discussed at 38 DICTA 65,
71 (1961).
73 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-11-2 (1953); Colo. R. Civ. P. 57 (b): "Any person . . . whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance . . . may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance .... .
74Meier v. Schooley, 363 P.2d 653 (Colo. 1961) (one of two grounds for denying declaratory
judgment). A concurring opinion by Sutton, J., though not citing Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery,
supra note 72, would follow the statute and rule, supro note 73.
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the matter.75 An information dealing with robbery of the manager
of a supermarket may properly allege that the money was taken
from the person and against the will of the manager, though the
money actually belonged to the supermarket rather than to him.
7 6
An information charging burglary of a business building in the
language of the old burglary statute ("office, shop or warehouse")
rather than the new statute ("building") is good; the information
need not charge the crime in the exact language of the statute;
it is enough if the defendant and the jury can readily understand
the offense charged.
3. Variance. - A larceny information charged the defendant
with stealing property of the Continental Oil Co., "a corporation,"
and at the trial the prosecution proved that he stole property of
that oil company, but it failed to prove the oil company was a
corporation. The supreme court properly upheld the larceny con-
viction, holding that the defendant could not have been misled
or prejudiced by the failure of the prosecution to prove this
irrelevant fact.7 7 On the other hand, an embezzlement information
charged the defendant with embezzling a $133 check duly signed
by an officer of a named corporation, but at the trial the prose-
cution's proof showed that the check was a forgery. The supreme
court properly reversed the embezzlement conviction on the ground
of a fatal variance, since here the prosecution's own proof dis-
closed that no embezzlement was committed.78 Someone, perhaps
the defendant, committed a forgery, but as forgery was not the
crime charged, the defendant could not be convicted of that.
D. Arraignment
One defendant, charged with armed robbery, failed to plead-
at least the record contained no reference to a plea-but the case
proceeded to trial as if he had pleaded not guilty. After conviction,
the defendant noticed the lack of a plea, but the conviction was
affirmed on the basis of a sensible Colorado statute.
7 9
E. Pre-Trial Discovery
The district attorney lawfully obtained possession of the de-
fendant's books before trial. The trial court ordered that the district
75 Schreiner v. People, 360 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1961).
76 Hampton v. People, 362 P.2d 864 (Colo. 1961).
77 Straub v. People, 358 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1961).
78 Burns v. People, 360 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1961).
79 Landford v. People, 365 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1961), relying on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37.7-9 (1953).
MARSOLEK'S HARDWARE & APPLIANCE STORE
Complete stock of Radios, Sporting Goods, Garden Supplies, Points,
Hardware, Television Sets, Hi-Fi Phonographs and Records
Radio and TV repair - 90 Day Guarantee
GARDEN TIME SPECIAL!
Plastic Garden Hose - 75 feet - $5.77
1/2 inch Rubber Garden Hose - 50 feet- $6.88
LAWN EQUIPMENT SPECIALS, TOO!
2606-16 E. Colfax FR 7-2764
Across from East High School
Open Evenings Until 8:00 P.M., Sundays 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
attorney permit the defendant to inspect these books for the pur-
pose of preparing his defense.80 This ruling, perhaps a little bold
in view of the traditional Colorado notion that pre-trial inspection
is not allowed,8 ' would also be upheld under the new Rules.
8 2
F. Trial Through Verdict
1. Voir Dire Examination. - A prospective juror stated on
voir dire that he had formed an opinion that defendant was guilty
but that he would put aside this opinion and be guided solely by
the evidence. Defendant's challenge for cause was denied and de-
fendant did not use a peremptory challenge on him. It was held
that (a) the trial court properly denied the challenge for cause and
(b) anyway the defendant, not having exercised all his peremptory
challenges, could not complain of the erroneous denial of a chal-
lenge for cause. 83 In another criminal case in which the two sides,
each entitled to three peremptory challenges, actually without
objection exercised four, the defendant could not secure a new
trial on the ground that the prosecution used too many challenges.
8 4
In a murder case it was held not reversible error for the district
attorney to examine prospective jurors concerning their scruples
about the death penalty, though he possessed only circumstantial
evidence of the defendant's guilt, 5 since there is always the possi-
bility that direct evidence might turn up unexpectedly at the trial.8 6
2. Conduct of District Attorney. - A district attorney, trying
separately a defendant and his accomplice, is guilty of misconduct
if, at the defendant's trial to a jury, he calls the accomplice to
the witness stand without any real expectation of eliciting from
him any evidence against the defendant, knowing instead that
the accomplice will probably refuse to testify on the grounds of
self-incrimination and thus harm the defendant's case in the eyes
of the jury.87 It is doubtless misconduct too for the district attorney
to intimate, on cross-examination of the defendant in a criminal
case, that the defendant had threatened witnesses, if he possesses
no evidence of such threats.8 Although it is wrong for the district
attorney in his closing argument to misstate the facts in evidence,
an unintentional misstatement, immediately corrected, does the
defendant no harm and so cannot be reversible error.8 9
3. Fair Trial: Impartial Tribunal. - It is necessary for a fair
trial that judge and jury be impartial. In one Colorado case the
supreme court reversed a murder conviction and remanded for a
new trial before another judge because it was convinced that it
found in the record of the trial evidence of the judge's prejudice
80 Fine v. People, 360 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1961).
81 See Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 162-63, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (1952) (trial court has no
discretionary power to permit inspection of tangible evidence, for it has no such power with respect
to documentary evidence).
82 Colo. R. Crim. P. 16 (a), discussed supra note 56.
83 Skeels v. People, 358 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1961).
84 Righi v. People, 359 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1961).
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 (1953) provides that the death penalty may not be imposed for
first-degree murder where the evidence of guilt is circumstantial rather than direct.
86 Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961).
87 De Gesualdo v. People, 364 P.2d 374 (Cola. 1961) (burglary conviction reversed for this
misconduct in view of trial court's failure, on defendant's request, to caution the jury to disregard
the incident), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 245 (1962).
88 Johnson v. People, 367 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1961) (holding, however, that the misconduct did not
constitute reversible error because the court promptly struck the question as improper).
89 Gallegos v. People, 362 P.2d 178 (Colo. 1961).
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against the defendant. 90 In another case, in which the defendant's
counsel accepted as a juror a lady whom he knew to be the wife of
a merchant policeman, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial
when his counsel learned, after the defendant's conviction, that
the lady's husband was also a deputy sheriff.9 1
4. Fair Trial: Newspaper Publicity. - One of the difficulties in
giving the defendant a fair trial is created by pre-trial publicity
about the defendant and his case. Such publicity may contain
damaging information as to the defendant's former convictions for
other crimes or his confession to this crime. The matter is particu-
larly bad if the defendant's confession or prior record is inadmissible
evidence at the trial. However, when an article appeared in a
newspaper referring to the defendant as an "ex-convict," but no
juror saw it, the incident did not harm the defendant's cause.
92
5. Free Transcript. - All the states, including Colorado, are
constitutionally required to furnish a free transcript or its equiva-
lent to any indigent defendant who after conviction has something
which he is entitled to have an appellate court review. Thus a
Colorado trial court must, on an indigent defendant's request,93
or even without a request,94 supply at government expense a court
reporter for the trial in Colorado county courts as well as district
courts.
95
6. Speedy Trial. - In one 1961 case the defendant, after a
prompt trial in municipal court, appealed to the superior court
where he was entitled to a trial de novo, but fourteen months passed
(during which time he was free on bail) before he was brought
to trial. He did not, meanwhile, demand a trial. After his trial and
conviction, over his objection that he had been denied his constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial, the supreme court reversed, holding
(a) his right to a speedy trial in the superior court was not satisfied
by a speedy trial in the municipal court, and (b) his failure to
demand a trial did not constitute a waiver of his right to a speedy
trial.9 6 On the waiver point, some authorities in other jurisdictions
have taken the contrary view,97 but it would seem that the Colo-
rado rule, that it is not the defendant's duty to press for trial under
the penalty of waiving his right to speedy trial if he does not do
so, is the better one.98
Another 1961 case holds that the defendant's right to a speedy
trial is not violated when he is speedily tried and sentenced, but
sentenced erroneously to a term of imprisonment in excess of that
allowable by law, and two years later, on defendant's motion
90 Penney v. People, 360 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1961). Doyle. J., dissented on the ground that the
record does not show the judge was biased, and even if he were biased his bias did not prejudice
defendant. As to the latter point, no doubt a defendant need not prove that he was actually
prejudiced if in fact the judge is shown to be biased. See Scott, State Criminal Procedure, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Prejudice, 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 319 (1954).
91 Ray v. People, 364 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1961).
92 Gallegos v. People, 362 P.2d 178 (Colo. 1961).
"2 Pacheco v. People, 360 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1961) (clerk's long-hand notes of objections and rulings
will not do).
9t4 Herren v. People, 363 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1961) (failure to request is not a waiver).
95 Ibid. Speeding case tried de nova on appeal to county court after trial in justice court. But
there is no need to do so in justice or municipal courts, which are not "courts of record,"
96 Hicks v. People, 364 P.2d 877 (Colo. 19611.
17 E.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 880 (1958)
(defendant's failure to demand trial is waiver of right to speedy trial).
98 Compare Herren v. People, supro note 94, (failure of defendant to request a court reporter is
not a waiver of his right to have one present).
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pointing out the error in the sentence, he is resentenced to a valid
term.99
Just as too much delay between accusation and trial may violate
the constitution, conversely too much speed may do so. In a 1961
case a motorist involved in an accident shortly after midnight was
arrested at the scene for driving under the influence and taken
before a justice of the peace; a complaint was drawn up charging
him with the crime; the justice held a trial at 2:30 a.m. at which
the defendant (after being informed of the possibility of fine and
imprisonment but not of the probability of the loss of his license)
pleaded guilty and was fined. The supreme court held that "the
summary, hasty, middle of the night justice" here dispensed was
a violation of the defendant's constitutional (due process) right
to a fair trial.100 The court held that the defendant's guilty plea
was not a waiver of his right not to be tried too speedily, for (a) he
did not know all the consequences of conviction (i.e., the probability
of license revocation) and (b) if he was in effect under the influ-
ence, as charged, he could not understandably waive his right. All
this is true, the court says, even though the justice may have acted
in a most considerate fashion by arising from his bed in the middle
of the night in order to accommodate the errant motorist by letting
him have his trial and continue on his way without a long delay.
7. Evidence. - The big event of 1961 in the area of criminal
evidence was the United States Supreme Court's holding, in Mapp
v. Ohio'01 (overruling Wolf v. Colorado10 2 ), that a state which
admits evidence obtained by unreasonable police search and seizure
violates due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This, of cotirse, will require a considerable change in pre-
existing Colorado police practices if criminals who are caught are
to be convicted. Colorado, however, need not slavishly follow
federal cases as to what searches and seizures are unreasonable.
Thus evidence seized without a search warrant as a result of a
search incident to an unlawful arrest is no doubt inadmissible, for
the search is then unreasonable; but Colorado, within certain limits
required by fairness, may have a different law of arrest from the
federal law of arrest. So, too, a federal search warrant cannot be
issued which goes beyond searching for the fruits (e.g., stolen
property) or instruments (e.g., burglar's tools, counterfeiting dies)
of crime; but the new Colorado Rules 10 3 allow a search warrant for
evidence of crime (e.g., defendant's diary or his blood-stained cloth-
ing) as well. To the extent that the Colorado law concerning arrest
and concerning search warrants differs from the federal law, the
reasonableness of the search and seizure will vary; and hence the
admissibility in Colorado courts of evidence searched for and seized
by Colorado police may, in a particular fact situation, differ from
the admissibility in federal courts of evidence obtained by federal
police in exactly the same fashion.
99 Casias v. People, 367 P.2d 327 (Colo. 1961).
100 Toland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961).
101 367 U.S. 643 (1961), discussed, with reference to Colorado in particular, in Weinstein, Local
Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 150 (1962).
102 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
103 Colo. R. Crim. P. 41 (b)(3).
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A number of Colorado criminal cases decided in 1961 necessarily
involved evidentiary problems. The admissibility of photographs
vividly portraying the shocking details of the crime 0 4 and the ad-
missibility in a variety of situations of evidence of defendant's
former convictions'0 5 were, as usual, favorite topics. A number of
cases dealt with the application of the rule permitting the jury
to draw an inference that the defendant stole or got property
through burglary or robbery, from the defendant's recent, ex-
clusive, unexplained possession of property taken by larceny,
burglary or robbery. 106 Two cases concerned the testimony of
prosecution witnesses whose names were not endorsed on the in-
formation. 0 7 Although a coerced confession is of course inadmissi-
ble, a confession is admissible without a hearing as to its volun-
tariness unless defendant first suggests that it is involuntary. 08
A psychiatrist was allowed to testify as an expert on insanity
though he had once said in a speech that a plumber is just as good
as a psychiatrist at determining the capacity of an accused to
recognize right and wrong!10 9 Evidence of defendant's flight after
waiting several days following the crime,110 as well as evidence
that defendant fabricated favorable evidence or tried to suppress
unfavorable evidence,"' is admissible as showing consciousness
of guilt. In Colorado there is no absolute rule that an accomplice's
testimony must be corroborated if the prosecution is to avoid a
directed verdict."
12
8. Burden of Proof: Presumption v. Inference. - A criminal de-
fendant may use certain defenses negativing guilt, sometimes loosely
termed "affirmative defenses," all of which, except for insanity,
may be shown under a plea of not guilty - such as the general
defenses of alibi, self-defense, mistake of fact or law, compulsion,
insanity, intoxication, infancy, and the special defenses created by
a specific proviso or exception applicable to a particular crime
(e.g., death after a year and a day, for murder or manslaughter;
termination of pregnancy on doctor's advice to save life, for abor-
tion). With all these defenses it is clear that the defendant has
the burden of going forward with some evidence showing that
such a defense may exist, for there is, as it were, a sort of presump-
tion, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the defense does not
exist. But the defendant's burden of persuasion is one only of raising
104 Skeels v. People, 358 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1961); Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961); Mills
v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961); Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961); Wooley v.
People, 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1961).
105 Gallegos v. People, 362 P.2d 178 (Colo. 1961); Stanmore v. People, 362 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1961)
(better to refer to former crimes as "former transactions"); Hampton v. People, 362 P.2d 864 (Colo.
1961); Garrison v. People, 364 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1961); Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo.
1961); Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961); Wooley v. People, 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1961).
106 Pena v. People, 363 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1961) (under the rule conviction of burglary sustained);
Ciccorelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961) (recognizing that the rule is one involving an inference,
not a presumption in a mandatory sense, i.e., the jury may infer guilt but it need not do so); Crux
v. People, 364 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961) (rule applies to robbery as well as to larceny and burglary);
Stevenson v. People, 367 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1961) (rule inoperative where no proof that defendant
was lessee, co-lessee, occupant or resident of premises where burglary loot found).
107 Fine v. People, 360 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1961) (allowing such a witness to testify is not reversible
error when defendant failed to object); Landtord v. People, 365 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1961) (defendant
not prejudiced even though witness was not endorsed until day of trial).
108 Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961).
109 Hammil v. People, 361 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1961).
110 Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 241 (1962).
111 Johnson v. People, 367 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1961).
112 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961).
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a reasonable doubt in the minds of the fact-finder (generally, the
jury) .113
One 1961 case' 1 4  involved the rule that the fact-finder may
(though it need not) infer defendant's guilt of larceny of property
from his recent, exclusive, unexplained possession of stolen property.
The trial court's instruction was that recent, exclusive, unex-
plained possession of stolen property raises a "presumption" that
the possessor stole it; that the burden of explaining recent, ex-
clusive possession was on the defendant; and that his explanation
must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in the
jury's minds. The instruction did not specifically state that the
jury must (as distinguished from may) find the defendant guilty
on proof of recent, exclusive possession if the defendant does not
explain it away to the extent of raising a reasonable doubt; but
the word "presumption" is so ambiguous as to be susceptible of
that meaning. 115 The supreme court held that the instruction, though
not a model one, was not so bad as to constitute reversible error.
It is submitted that an instruction which states an inference in the
language of a presumption without further explanation is so dan-
gerously misleading that it ought to be held to constitute reversible
error.
116
9. Directed Verdict. - In order for the prosecution to avoid a
directed verdict, it must put on a prima facie case,1 17 but need
not put on all the evidence it has.""
10. Instructions. - In a 1960 criminal case the Colorado Su-
preme Court advised Colorado trial courts to couch their instruc-
tions in the language of the applicable criminal statute.119 In a
1961 case, however, the supreme court reversed a trial court which
too literally followed this advice.12 ° The trouble is that the statute
sometimes contains too much law, sometimes too little law, and
113 2 King, Colorado Practice Methods § 2377 (1956, Supp. 1961).
114 Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961).
115 See McCormick, Evidence § 308 (1954), on "Presumptions, Permissive and Mandatory."
116 So held in Barfield v. United States, 229 F.2d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 1956) (the court said, con-
cerning the inference of guilt of larceny from recent, exclusive, unexplained possession: "We think
too, that the use of the words 'presumption' and 'presume' in the instruction was misleading. What
the court was dealing with was an inference rather than a presumption."); United States v. Sherman,
171 F.2d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 1948), per L. Hand, J. (same; "the jury may be misled by the word
'presumption' ").
117 In two 1961 Colorado cases the supreme court reversed convictions for failure to make out
a prima facie case: Gonzales v. People, 361 P.2d 358 (Colo. 1961) (prosecution's proof: defendant
borrowed uncle's car; five hours later uncle's car, occupied by persons unknown, was seen pushing
a stolen car; held, in prosecution for larceny of car, verdict should have been directed for defendant);
Butmeister v. People, 361 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1961) (in prosecution for false pretenses, prosecution's
proof was that defendant was paid as if he had used own car for official trips, when in fact he
used government car; held, verdict should have been directed for defendant because of lack of
evidence that defendant ever represented that he used own car).
118 Tafoya v. People, 366 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1961).
119 Vigil v. People, 143 Cola. 328, 334, 353 P.2d 82, 85-86 (1960), discussed at 38 DICTA 65,
75-76 (1961), not altogether with approval, for the particular statutes which the supreme court
advised the trial court to cite in a case involving the defense of self-defense included a lot of
matter which had nothing to do with self-defense.
120 Johnson v. People, 358 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1961). A single Colorado statute, Colo. Rev. Stat.
40-1-12 (1953) defines and punishes as a principal an accessory before the fact (one, not present,
wha has advised or encouraged the perpetration of a crime) and defines (though it is the following
sectian which punishes, less severely than a principal is punished) an accessory during the fact
(one who, finding himself present when a crime is being committed, does not do what he can to
prevent it). In the Johnson case the undisputed evidence showed the defendant, who had driven
two robbers to the scene, left before they committed the robbery. The trial court, reading from the
statute, unfortunately included the inapplicable part concerning an accessory during the fact, and
then, because it did not also give the following section of the statute punishing less severely the
crime of being an accessory during the fact, may have left the impression that an accessory during




sometimes ambiguous formulations of the law, so that to follow
the statute too closely may confuse or mislead the jury.
One case held that the trial court erred in failing, on its own
motion, to give an instruction dealing with the defendant's theory
of his defense after it properly failed to give the defendant's
tendered instruction, which erroneously stated the law concerning
his theory of defense. 21 A number of other cases dealt with the
prejudicial effect of erroneous instructions. Thus it was held not
to be reversible error, in a murder case, to instruct on involuntary
manslaughter (as to which there was no evidence), where the
jury convicted of murder,' 22 in spite of the rule expressed in an-
other case that "generally it is improper to instruct on a degree of
homicide not sustained by the evidence.' 1 3 Erroneous instructions
favorable to the defendant do not, of course, constitute reversible
error.1 24 In a case wherein the defendant, after pleading insanity,
virtually abandoned this defense there is no need for instructions
on insanity especially if the defendant did not request any instruc-
tion thereon. 125 The court need not instruct specifically on such
"defenses" to a homicide charge as that the victim committed
suicide or accidentally shot himself where the given instructions
adequately set forth the elements of murder, the law on burden
of proof, and the need to acquit if the crime is not proved. 126
The trial court should not communicate instructions to the
jury outside the courtroom and without the presence of counsel
when the jury, having retired to consider its verdict, desires further
instructions; but this conduct, although improper, does not con-
stitute reversible error where no harm is done.127
11. Verdict. - A jury which was given the standard "third
degree" instruction 28  after becoming "hopelessly dead-locked"
twenty-five hours after submission to it of a murder case, was
held not to have been coerced into a verdict. 29
121 Ibid. (Doyle, J., dissenting).
122 Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961), Had the jury found the defendant guilty of
involuntary manslaughter, however, the instruction would have been reversible error becbuse the
jury might have acquitted him if the opportunity for a compromise verdict had not been presented.
Dickens v. People, 67 Colo. 409, 186 Pac. 277 (1919).
123 See Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 241 (1962).
124 Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961).
125 Cruz v. People, 364 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961).
126 Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961).
127 Ray v. People, 364 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1961) (jury, deliberating fate of two co-defendants, sent
message to judge at home via the bailiff asking whether it could convict one defendant and acquit
the other; the judge told the bailiff to write "yes" on a slip of paper and deliver it to the jury).
128 "You should consider that this case must at sometime be decided; that you have been selected
in the same manner and from the same source as any future jury must be; that there is no reason to
suppose that the case will ever be submitted to twelve men more intelligent, more impartial or
more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence will be produced on the one side or
the other; that in order to bring twelve minds to a unanimous conclusion you must examine the
questions submitted to you with candor and n proper regard and deference to the opinions of each
other; that you ought to pay proper respect to each other's opinions and listen with a disposition
to be convinced to each other's arguments.
"If a majority of your number are for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether a
doubt in his own mind is a reasonable one which makes no impression upon the minds of so many
men equally honest and intelligent with himself, who under the sanction of the same oath have
heard the same evidence, with the same attention and an equal desire to arrive at the truth.
"On the other hand, if a majority are for acquittal, the minority ought seriously to ask them.
selves whether they may not reasonably, and ought not to, doubt the correctness of a judgment
from which so many of their number dissent, and distrust the weight or sufficiency of that evidence
which fails to carry conviction to the minds of their fellows.
"And, while at the last each juror must act upon his own judgment concerning the evidence
in the case and not upon the judgment of his fellows, it is your duty, guided by the foregoing and
by all of the instructions heretofore given in this case, to decide the case, if you can conscientiously
do so.
"It is accordingly ordered by the court that you be returned to your jury room for further
deliberation."
129 Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961).
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G. Sentence
One convicted of any one of several named sex crimes may
be sentenced (for one day to life) to the penitentiary, under the
Colorado statute.130 The trial court, in deciding whether to sentence
the sex offender under the regular law or to do so under the sex
offender law (i.e., in deciding whether he is a threat to the public
or is an habitual offender and mentally ill) need not follow the
advice contained in the psychiatric report which the court re-
quested before imposing sentence.
13 '
In sentencing habitual criminals, trial courts sometimes make
mistakes. It is, of course, improper to sentence the two time habitual
offender to two consecutive terms of imprisonment, one for the
substantive crime and one for the former crime.1 32 A felony con-
viction in another state counts for habitual criminal purposes, even
though the conduct for which convicted there does not constitute
a felony under Colorado law. 33 Trial courts sometimes make other
sorts of mistakes in sentencing. Where the court orally stated, in
sentencing the defendant, that the sentence was to be served con-
currently with another sentence he had earlier received, but the
mittimus stated the sentence was to be served consecutively, the
supreme court ordered the mittimus corrected to conform to the
sentence as actually imposed.1 34 The trial court has power to correct
an illegal sentence, on defendant's motion, even after the expiration
of the term of court. 35 But it may not increase a sentence once the
defendant has begun to serve it.' 36
130 Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961) (the statute, however, empowers the parole
board to transfer the sex offender from the penitentiary to the state hospital or other institution).
131 Ibid. (psychiatric report stated defendant was not mentally deficient, and contained no state-
ment that he was a threat to the public.)
132 Righi v. People, 359 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1961).
133 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961) (carrying concealed weapons is a Nebraska felony,
as proved by a certified copy of the Nebraska statute defining and punishing that crime).
134 Duran v. People, 360 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1961).
135 Casias v. People, 367 P.2d 327 (Colo. 1961) (defendant illegally received 25-30 year sentence
in 1959 for burglary as a third felony offender, when in fact he was only a second offender;
defendant p roperly resentenced in 1961 to 10-15 years as a second offender; Villalon v. People,
358 P.2d 18 (Cola. 1961). Colo. R. Crim. P. 35 (a) provides that an illegal sentence (e.g., punish-
ment for a crime awarded in excess of that allowed by law for that crime; multiple and consecutive
punishment for what is in effect one offense) may be corrected at any time. A sentence is not
illegal, however, because it comes at the end of a trial during which errors occurred. Hill v. United
States, 82 Sup. Ct. 468 (U.S. 1962).
136 Righi v. People, 359 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1961).
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A justice of the peace may sentence a youth between sixteen
and twenty-one, convicted of a misdemeanor, to the reformatory
even though the reformatory is in another county.
137
H. Review on Writ of Error
As noted above, abstracts of record and assignments of error
in criminal cases have been abolished by the new Rules and the
procedure which governs the form and filing of records and briefs
on writ of error in civil cases applies in criminal cases. 1 3  But, for
the time being at least, the present cumbersome procedure for
obtaining a writ of error in a criminal case - "lodging" the record
in the supreme court within six months from the judgment of
conviction - rather than the simple act of filing a praecipe in the
supreme court as in a civil case, is still required. 3 9
Also as previously noted, the present procedural rule requiring
the defendant to raise an alleged trial court error by a motion for
new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment before the supreme court
will review the error 140 is continued under the new Rules. 4 1
In a case in which the convicted defendant showed that the
justice court in convicting him (at too hasty a trial) "exceeded
its jurisdiction,'1 42 the supreme court upheld the district court's
granting him the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, vacating the
judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, because it was
doubtful whether the defendant (having pleaded guilty) could have
appealed his conviction in the regular way.
143
Another case concerned th6 conclusiveness, upon supreme court
review on writ of error, of recitals in the record. 144 Perhaps the
record showed the defendant was arraigned and pleaded, but on
error he.denied that these events ever took place. The supreme
court held that, at least where the defendant is represented at his
trial by competent counsel, recitals in the record are conclusive
on writ of error, for the defendant must seasonably call the trial
court's attention to the defect for correction at the time.145
The scope of supreme court review of trial court action in
punishing a direct criminal contempt (misbehavior in the court's
presence) is limited.1 46 So too is judicial review on certiorari of
the parole board's discretionary action in revoking parole. 147
137 Aranda v. People, 361 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1961).
138 Colo. R. Crim. P. 39 (a).
139 Colo. R. Crim. P. 39 (a), discussed at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 83-84 (1961).
140 Cruz v. People, 364 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961); Dyer v. People, 364 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1961) (unless
justice requires review).
141 Colo. R. Crim. P. 37(b) ("except that plain error or defects affecting substantive rights may
be noted although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court").
142 Colo. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(4) permits district courts to grant certiorari relief where an inferior
tribunal has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy." On certiorari, review is limited to a determination of whether the tribunal
exceeded its jurisdiction. "Jurisdiction" is here not used in its usual sense of power to hear and
decide, for a justice court has power to hear and decide misdemeanor cases. A court apparently
"exceeds its jurisdiction" when it tries a defendant in a manner which violates constitutional rights.
143 Tolland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961).
144 Apparently meaning the clerk's record containing minutes of the proceedings, rather than the
transcript prepared by the court reporter.
145 Madrid v. People, 365 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1961).
146 Wall v. District Court, 360 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1961).
147 Berry v. People, 367 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1961). It would seem, however, that there can be court
review of the procedure involved in parole revocation. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-17-6 (1953), as amended
by Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 104, requires at least a parole board investigation before revocation.
No statute requires a hearing, however. Cf., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-16-9, requiring a court hearing
before revocations of probation, as distinguished from parole.
DICTA
MARCH-APRIL, 1962
The facts of one 1961 case raise an interesting double-jeopardy
problem, although it is not discussed by the court. A defendant,
charged with robbery and murder, was convicted of robbery but
acquitted of murder, and on writ of error he obtained a reversal
of his robbery conviction, the supreme court remanding the case
for a new trial.148 On the new trial can the defendant be tried for
murder as well as robbery, or does his acquittal on the murder




Since Rule 35 (b) of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides a new post-conviction remedy (a motion in the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence)
for prisoners in custody, under certain limited circumstances (which
are, however, broader circumstances than the ones which Colorado
recognizes for habeas corpus purposes),15° the remedy of habeas
corpus for prisoners in custody will henceforth have less significance
than heretofore. 15' Up until November of 1961, however, habeas
corpus was still in vogue. But habeas corpus cannot help a prisoner
who complains that the parole board is not giving his case proper
consideration;1 152 and it will not help one who fails to attach, as
required by law, the warrant of commitment to his petition. 53 A
petition for habeas corpus which alleges a commutation of sentence
by the governor entitling the prisoner to release from imprison-
ment states a good claim for habeas corpus relief, and, if the state
wishes to contest his release on the ground that the governor re-
voked the commutation, it must do so by evidence at the hearing
held to determine whether to release the prisoner.154 It would seem,
however, that the matter of revocation of the commutation could be
determined on the basis of the files and records of the case so that
there need not be a hearing to decide the matter.
155
J. Confession of Error
In at least two 1961 cases the attorney general, in appearing
before the supreme court on writ of error obtained by a convicted
defendant, confessed error, in the tradition of the office of the
Solicitor General of the United States before the United States
Supreme Court. 5 6
K. Statutory Changes
The 1961 Colorado legislature made several changes in existing
criminal procedure. Upon an insanity plea being made, the court
148 Johnson v. People, 358 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1961).
149 The matter is discussed briefly in King, Colorado Pro",;cn Methods § 2389 n. 94 (Supp. 1961).
150 Sen comment on Rule 35 in 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 63-78 (1961).
151 See id. at 66-67, for the proposition that a prisoner in custody cannot seek habeas corpus
relief without first making a motion under Rule 35(b).
152 Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961).
153 Wright v. Tinsley, 365 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1961). A less technical reason, not used by the court,
for upholding the lower court's denial of habeas corpus sought on the ground that at his triol he
wos deprived of a jury trial, is that he actually obtained a review of his conviction on writ of
error without mentioning this ground, and his conviction was affirmed. If the matter is reviewable
on error, as here, it must be so reviewed, for habeas corpus is no substitute for a writ of error.
154 Sharp v. Tinsley, 362 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1961).
155 Rule 35 (b), on the post-conviction motion to vacate sentence, provides that if "the files and
record of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,"
then no hearing is necessary.
156 Penny v. People, 360 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1961) (confessing that the trial court erred in not
directing a verdict of acquittal); Pacheco v. People, 360 P.2d 974 (Colo. 1961) (confessing that the
trial court erred in not having a court reporter present to transcribe the proceedings).
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may order the defendant examined by psychiatrists at the jail in
which he is confined, rather than having him sent (as has had to
be done heretofore) either to the State Hospital at Pueblo or the
Colorado Psychopathic Hospital at Denver for his examination.
15
Cash security for a bail bond is authorized in addition to the secu-
rity of sureties on the bail bond.158 A criminal complaint made for
the purpose of the issuance of an arrest warrant may be made be-
fore not only a judge or justice, as in the past, but also before his
clerk or deputy clerk.159 An amended statute provides for dismissal
of a criminal case unless tried within two terms of court after com-
mitment of the defendant; 160 but the effect of this statute is uncer-
tain, for the new Rules, after sensibly doing away with the term-of-
court concept of time, made the period of time one year.'6 County
and municipal police officers are now specifically authorized to
cross county and municipal boundaries in fresh pursuit of a traffic
violator.162 A final 1961 statute changes the composition of the
parole board and it makes some small alterations in the procedure
to be used by parole officials in revocation of parole. 163
157 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 102, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-2 (1953). The change was
made to reduce the defendant's use of the plea as a method of improving his chances to escape.
158 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 100, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-17 (1953). Colo. R. Crim.
P. 46(c) (1961) authorizes cash bail as well as a bond with surety or a personal recognizance bond.
159 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 99, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-2.3, 7 (1953). See Colo. R.
Crim. P. 3 for issuance of a complaint.
160 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 101, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-7-12 (1953).
161 Colo. R. Crim. P. 48(b). The effect of a conflict between statute and rule is discussed supra
notes 63-70 and text.
162 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 103.
163 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 104, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-17-3, 6 (1953).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER CLARK*
The cases reviewed in this article were decided between Janu-
ary 1, 1961, and December 31, 1961. A relatively large number of
domestic relations opinions by the Colorado Supreme Court during
this period paralleled its generally greater output of cases. Most of
the domestic relations cases were concerned with the financial and
property aspects of divorce and separation. No sharp departures
from prior law were noted, but some of the cases did deal with
interesting legal questions.
I. COMMON LAW MARRIAGE
The Colorado law of common law marriage took a new turn
with In re Peterson's Estate.' This was a petition to determine heir-
ship, in which the contestants were the alleged widow and the col-
lateral relatives of the deceased. The deceased and his wife had
been divorced, but during the interlocutory period had resumed
cohabitation. She relied upon this resumption of cohabitation to
support her claim of common law marriage, a claim which was
rejected by the trial court. On appeal the supreme court reversed
on the ground that the trial court had misapplied the standards for
weighing the evidence of common law marriage. Rather than the
usual rule, which was stated by the trial court to be that common
law marriage must be proved by convincing and positive evidence,
the supreme court held that a special rule should be applied to
common law remarriage. The common law remarriage need only
be proved by evidence which is less than convincing and positive.
How much less convincing the evidence may be is not stated.2 This
doctrine, the vagueness of which is probably unavoidable, is said
to rest upon the general policy favoring remarriage of divorced per-
sons, and upon the Pennsylvania authorities 3 which have taken the
same position. Why remarriage should be socially more acceptable
than marriage remains a mystery.
II. ANNULMENT
Young v. Colorado National Bank4 dealt with the nature of
annulment and the procedure to be used in deciding annulment
cases. This was a suit by a husband to annul his marriage on the
ground of mental incompetency.5 Trial was had to a jury, but during
the proceedings the trial judge ruled that the jury would be ad-
visory only. The jury found for the husband, and the court entered
a decree of annulment. On appeal various errors were alleged. Those
within the scope of this article were as follows: (a) Was the case
properly triable by jury or by advisory jury only? (b) Is the mar-
riage invalid where the statutory blood test is not obtained? (c)
What is the standard of proof in annulment cases?
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Low.
1 365 P.2d 254 (Colo. 1961).
2 Unfortunately the court does not say what the evidence of common law marriage was, so
that we cannot evaluate the extent to which the presumption favoring common law remarriage
will go in specific cases.
3 The leading case is In re Wagner's Estate, 398 Pa. 531, 159 A.2d 495 (1960).
4 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).




The first question was answered by a holding that the case
was triable by jury. The court discussed the nature of annulment
at some length, and concluded that it is a statutory action in which
the trial court exercises equity powers. This is about as satisfactory
a characterization as can be made upon the basis of some very con-
fusing precedents.6 It amounts to a holding that the court in annul-
ment cases must act in accordance with statute, but where the
statutes are silent, general doctrines of equity control. The annul-
ment statute in force in Colorado until the 1957 amendments made
this explicit, 7 the only question being whether the amendments
changed the law.
The court then went on to hold that under Rules 38 (a) and
39 (c) 8 the trial of a non-jury case to a jury with consent of both
parties and the trial judge is a jury trial in the usual sense, resulting
in a verdict which is binding and not merely advisory. This con-
struction of Rule 39 (c) is in accord with the literal wording of the
corresponding federal rule 9 wording which for some reason was
omitted from the Colorado rule. Jury trial in annulment cases may
now be had as a matter of right.10
On the second question, the court held that non-compliance
with the statutory requirement of a blood test does not invalidate
the marriage. The authorities seem to agree on this point" on the
theory that the blood test requirement is directory rather than
mandatory. One may approve the result without being impressed
by the reasoning. So long aq Colorado recognizes the validity of
common law marriage, it cannot, logically invalidate marriages for
failure to comply with licensing or blood test statutes.
The court answered the third question by holding that in an-
nulment cases the "preponderance of the evidence" rule is inappli-
cable and that the plaintiff must prove his case by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence. It is not clear why this should be so, although
there is support for it in the cases. 1" In any event the distinction
between evidence which merely preponderates and evidence which
is clear and convincing is probably so vague as to make the choice
of verbal formula an academic matter.
A further interesting question was raised but not discussed by
the Young case. The plaintiff husband died after the trial court had
granted the annulment but before the case was decided on appeal.
Under the applicable statute marriages of incompetents are only
voidable, not void. 13 In other jurisdictions the death of a plaintiff
before a final decree in an action to annul a voidable marriage
6 Leading cases include Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. R. 557 (N.Y. 1825) and Wightman v.
Wightman, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 343 (N.Y. 1820), the latter case being written by Chancellor Kent. See
aIso 2 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce § 294 (6th ed. 1880), and Lyannes v. Lyannes, 171 Wis. 381,
177 N.W. 683 (1920).
7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-3-2 (1953) provided- "Grounds for Annulment.-Actions for annulment
may be maintained upon the following grounds: (1) Upon the ground set forth in section 46-3-1,
providing the party seeking such annulment is under the age of nineteen years at the time of the
institution of the suit. (2) In such other cases as ore recognized in equity."
S Colo. R. Civ. P. 38 (a), 39"(c).
0 Fed. R. Civ. P. 39 (c) contains the following language not found in the Colorado Rule- " .
whose verdict has the same effect as if trial by jury had been a matter of right."
1(0 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 115, § 1.
I1 Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (1939).
12 E.g., Rathburn v. Rathburn, 138 Cal.App.2d 568, 292 P.2d 274 (1956) (annulment for fraud);
Godfrey v. Shatwell, 38 N.J.Super. 501, 119 A.2d 479 (1955) (annulment for impotence). Some caution
should be exercised in generalizing here, since the care with whch the evidence is scrutinized may
vary with the grounds al eged.
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-3-1 (7) (Supp. 1960).
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abates the action.14 A similar rule governs divorce actions.15 Wheth-
er the fact that death occurred pending appeal rather than trial
should make a difference in result ought to depend upon the prac-
tical consequences. In the Young case a refusal to abate the action
might result in the wife being unable to inherit. It would seem
desirable generally to honor her claim as against the claims of col-
lateral relatives, and therefore a rule which would abate the action
should be preferred. It is unfortunate that this question was not
discussed in the court's opinion.
16
III. DIVORCE: GROUNDS AND PROCEDURE
A single case, Poos v. Poos,17 dealt with grounds for divorce in
1961. It held that when the divorce case is submitted to the jury,
(as it now may be as a matter of right on the demand of either
party)"' the court must give instructions defining the statutory
grounds for divorce. In this case the ground relied on was cruelty
and the supreme court said that the charge should be sufficiently
clear to enable a layman not acquainted with the technicalities of
law to understand both the relevant facts and the controlling legal
principles. This holding seems proper, but it is regrettable that the
court did not go on to indicate just how the offense of cruelty should
have been defined, since the law of Colorado is not exactly crystal
clear in that respect. 19
Two questions of divorce procedure were decided by Kaminsky
v. Kaminsky;20 first that the defense of res judicata resting on a
prior decree of divorce could be raised by a motion for summary
judgment, and second that personal service on an adjudicated in-
sane defendant was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under
an earlier version of the statute.21 Such service would not be suffi-
14 E.g., Merrick v. Merrick, 314 Ill. App. 623, 42 N.E.2d 341 (1942); Dibble v. Meyer, 203 Ore.
541, 278 P.2d 901 (1955). See also Patey v. Peaslee, 99 N.H. 335, 111 A.2d 194 (1955) and other
cases cited in Annot., Right to Attack Validity of Marriage After Death of Party Thereto, 47 A.L.R.2d
1393 (1956), and 1 Armstrong, California Family Law 83-84 (1953).
15 Cases are collected in Annots., 158 A.L.R. 1205 (1945), and 104 A.L.R. 654 (1936).
16 The question appears not to have been raised in the briefs on either side. Briefs for Plaintiff
in Error, Brief for Defendant in Error, Young v. Colorado National Bank, 365 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1961).
17 359 P.2d 3 (Colo. 1961).
18 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 115, § 1.
19 Compare Carroll v. Carroll, 135 Colo. 379, 311 P.2d 709 (1957), with Reed v. Reed, 138 Colo.
74, 379 P.2d 633 (1958).
20 359 P.2d 675 (Colo. 1961).
21 Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 56, § 4 (1935).
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cient under the statute now in force, 22 which requires service on
the insane person, on his conservator if any, and on a guardian
ad litem who must be appointed by the court.
IV. PROPERTY, ALIMONY AND SUPPORT
Kaminsky v. Kaminsky23 held that a wife may bring suit to
have her property rights adjudicated after her husband has obtained
a divorce, where the property rights were not adjudicated in the
divorce action. This result was reached even though the wife had
been personally served in the divorce action. The case seems to be
in accord with similar cases in other jurisdictions.
2 4
The familiar principle that the amount of alimony or property
awards rests within the discretion of the trial court was again
adhered to by the court.25 This was qualified in one case2 6 by the
rule that the trial court must base its award on conditions existing
at the time of the hearing. It was held error to grant an award
based on an order made in a prior divorce action some ten years
before. In arriving at an equitable division of property it may be
necessary to rely upon the testimony of an appraiser, but Bournakis
v. Bournakis27 held that where the appraiser is appointed by the
court, the parties are entitled to present their own evidence of
value and to cross-examine the court's appraiser.
The enforcement and modification of alimony orders came up
in three cases. In the first of these 28 the court restated the view
that the acquittal or conviction, in contempt proceedings, of one
charged with non-compliance with an alimony decree is within the
sound discretion of the trial court, to be reversed only for an abuse
of that discretion. In the same case it was held that accrued and
unpaid installments due under the alimony decree cannot be can-
celed or modified. The effect of this is that although contempt may
not lie to enforce the payment of such installments, they remain
represented by a valid final judgment which may be enforced in
the same manner as any judgment at law. The second case 29 like-
wise refused to approve modification of past installments, and fur-
ther held that the emancipation of a child does not automatically
affect the amount due under the alimony decree. If the father
wishes he may move to modify the decree on this ground, but until
the motion is heard and granted, his liability remains unaffected.
The third case, 30 involving separate maintenance rather than di-
vorce, held that modification of the alimony order cannot be granted
unless a motion seeking that remedy is filed. In this case the wife
sought to enforce the order by contempt proceedings. The trial
court, finding that the amount required was so large as to be in-
equitable, reduced it. The supreme court reversed, saying that on
the case before it the trial court's only function was to decide
22 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-2 (3) (Supp. 1960).
23 Supro note 20.
24 2 Freemen, Judgments § 912 (5th ed. 1925). The present statute enacts the some rule. Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 46-1-5 (4) (Supp. 1960).
25 Walden v. Walde,,. 363 P.2d 168 (Colo. 1961); Samuelson v. Samuelson, 360 P.2d 451 (Colo.
1961); Traynor v. Trayjr, 360 P.2d 431 (Colo. 1961). See also Flor v. Flor, 366 P.2d 664 (Colo.
1961).
26 Boyer v. Boyer, 366 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961).
27 361 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1961).
28 Enolemon v. Englemon, 358 P.2d 864 (Colo. 1961).
29 Taylor v. Taylor, 362 P.2d 1027 (Colo. 1961).
30 Lopez v. Lopez, 366 P.2d 373 (Colo. 1961).
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whether or not the defendant was in contempt. It could have held
him not in contempt due to his inability to pay, but it could not
reduce the payments. This case seems to place a disproportionate
weight upon matters of form, since the court concedes that on the
facts shown the defendant could have had the payments reduced
if he had proceeded in the proper way.
The case of Scheer v. District Court3' determined an interesting
question of jurisdiction under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act. 32 (This statute was amended by the General As-
sembly in 1961).33 The Scheer case held that an ex-wife could ini-
tiate an action for support of the children under the statute not-
withstanding the fact that a divorce action had been brought in
Colorado, and a decree of divorce granted with a reservation of
jurisdiction over the custody and support of the children. The
grounds for the decision were two: (a) the children and their
mother having left Colorado, the divorce court had no jurisdiction
as to custody and support; and (b) under the Reciprocal Act and by
general equity principles jurisdiction over custody and support of
children exists separately from the divorce action.
A single case involving criminal non-support, Pacheco v. Peo-
ple,34 held that an indigent defendant in such cases is entitled to
have a transcript of testimony furnished to him free of charge, and
also to have a court reporter so that such a transcript may be made.
Although it may be outside the scope of this article, notice
should here be taken of the amendment to the desertion and non-
support laws enacted in 196135 which authorizes the clerk of the
district court to review alimony and child support orders, on his
own motion to send notices of non-payment, and to request the
district judge to issue contempt citations when payments are in
arrears. This procedure is only authorized where the clerk of the
district court has received written consent to take such steps both
from the attorney for the plaintiff and from the plaintiff herself.
The statute applies to payments ordered either in divorce, separate
maintenance or annulment decrees.
Two cases in 1961 decided questions relating to attorney fees
in divorce actions. One of these, Stockham v. Stockham, 36 held that
the defendant husband could be required to pay his wife's attorney
fees even though the parties had become reconciled and resumed
cohabitation. The court said that under these circumstances the
divorce action was still pending and the trial court had not been
divested of jurisdiction. The other case, Tower v. Tower,37 ordered
the husband to pay the wife's attorney a specified fee, notwith-
standing the fact that the attorney was not a party to the action.
The court said that this result prevented multiplicity of suits, and
31 363 P.2d 1059 (Colo. 1961). Another case of minor interest, Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 367
P.2d 594 (Colo. 1961), held that appropriate relief by way of support of children should be granted
notwithstanding that the plaintiff had erroneously relied on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act.
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-2-1 to 43-2-16 (1953).
33 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961 ch. 114, § 1, repealing Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-2-1 to 43-2-16 (1953), and
enacting a new statute in its place.
34 360 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1961).
35 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 113, § 2.
36 358 P.2d 1026 (Colo. 1961).
37 364 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1961).
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that the attorney would be treated as an intervenor even though he
had not filed a petition for intervention. The contrast is striking
between this case, with its willingness to sweep aside technical
matters to determine the merits of the case, and the Lopez case 88
which insisted upon the observance of procedural technicalities.
One additional item of interest in the Tower case is its mention of
the fact that the parties to the divorce action made an agreement
by which, in exchange for certain concessions, the husband prom-
38 Lopez v. Lopez, Supra note 30.
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ised not to contest the divorce.39 Such contracts have been univer-
sally held collusive in other states,40 but the supreme court was
apparently not troubled by this element of the case.
V. CUSTODY
The troublesome question of jurisdiction over the custody of
children, already much confused in Colorado as in other states, was
not much clarified by 1961's crop of cases. One case, Wiggins v.
Miller,41 refused to enforce a Kansas custody order on the ground
that it was void for lack of due process. It is not clear precisely
where due process was violated, the court speaking at one point
of lack of notice, and at another of lack of a hearing. On the court's
own showing the child's father had notice, so the real objection
probably was that there was no hearing. A second case, Kraudel v.
Benner,42 enforced a foreign custody order, in this instance one
entered in Illinois, where the mother had kept the child in Colorado
in violation of the Illinois decree. Apparently the enforcement here
was by way of comity only, the court not mentioning full faith and
credit. The only difficulty with the case is that the Illinois divorce
decree was given without personal service upon the mother. May v.
Anderson 43 (not cited by the court) would say that such a decree
is not entitled to full faith and credit. The defect of lack of service
may have been cured, however, by the fact that the mother per-
sonally appeared in the Illinois modification proceeding, and it was
the modified decree which was being enforced against her in this
action.
A third case contains dictum that the Colorado courts lose
jurisdiction over the custody of a child when his domicile is changed
to another state.44 This indicates a disposition to apply the same
rule to jurisdiction over custody in Colorado which has in the past
been applied by Colorado courts to custody orders originating in
other states.4  The rule is otherwise in many other states.46
The most important custody case decided this year was Lopez
v. Smith.47 The facts in the case were that the parents of the child
in question had left the child with Sara Lopez for fourteen years.
At the end of that time the child was forcibly removed by the par-
ents. An adoption proceeding was then begun by Sara Lopez in the
County Court of Conejos County where she sought a writ of habeas
corpus to regain custody of the child. The child's parents then
sought a writ of prohibition from the supreme court forbidding the
county court to hear the habeas corpus case.
The writ of prohibition was granted on the ground that the
county court lacked jurisdiction to hear the habeas corpus petition.
39 Tower v. Tower, 364 P.2d 565, 567 (Colo. 1961).
40 The authorities are collected in Clark, Separation Agreements, 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 149, 158
(1956). Perhaps the definition of collusion now found in the Colorado divorce statute does not
include agreements not to defend. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 46-1-4 (1) (d) (Supp. 1960).
41 360 P.2d 111 (Colo. 1961).
42 366 P.2d 667 (Cola. 1961).
43 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
44 Scheer v, District Court, 363 P.2d 1059, 1060 (Colo. 1961): ... when a child's domicile is
changed he is no longer subject to the control of the court which first awarded his custody."
45 Hodgen v. Byrne, 105 Colo. 410, 98 P.2d 1000 (1940); People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94
Colo. 47, 27 P.2d 1038 (1933).
46 E.g., People ex rel. Koelsch v. Rone, 3 111.2d 483, 121 N.E,2d 738 (1954); Haney v. Knight,
197 Md. 212, 78 A.2d 643 (1951).
47 360 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1961). It is noteworthy that a similar case arose in 1958, except that there
the mother sought habeas corpus. The supreme court there held habeas corpus would lie. Johnson
v. Block, 137 Colo. 119, 332 P.2d 99 (1958).
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Although the basis for this decision is not clear, it seems to reside
in the following: "In the absence of a right to custody based on an
adjudication decreeing adoption on one of the statutory grounds
or on a finding of dependency under that statute, a third person,
which the respondent here apparently is, may not maintain a habeas
corpus action seeking an award of custody of a child as against the
child's natural parents upon an allegation of prior abandonment
by the parents. '48 At another place in the opinion the court states
flatly that "a stranger lacks standing to maintain habeas corpus
looking to an award of custody as against the parents of the child
who are presumed to be entitled to the custody."49 This carries the
so-called parental right theory to its ultimate conclusion, making it
a fixed rule of procedure. It seems to mean that in any case in which
a parent is able to kidnap a child from a non-parent, no matter how
long the non-parent may have had custody, and no matter how dis-
astrous it may be for the child's welfare, the non-parent has no
remedy because he has no standing to bring habeas corpus.
A thorough criticism of the Lopez case would take this review
far beyond its appropriate space limits. Nevertheless the case is so
destructive of principles which have been laid down for the protec-
tion of children that some of its more obvious errors should be
pointed out. In the first place habeas corpus is the remedy par ex-
cellence for the decision of disputes over custody, originating in the
English common law and being well established in the United States
for over a hundred years, entirely apart from statute. 0 The Colo-
rado statute which refers to it is not the one cited in the Lopez
case,51 but is another section 52 which recognizes the action in general
terms and which does not exclude strangers as parties.
Second, in habeas corpus the question is not one of "legal right"
or "prima facie right," but of the child's welfare.53 When that ques-
tion arises in disputes between parents and non-parents the parents
have an advantage, but so far as the writer is aware there is no
rule of jurisdiction which says that the non-parent cannot even
contest the parent's physical possession of the child.54 The contrary
has been the rule ever since the leading case of Chapsky v. Wood 55
awarded custody of a child to the child's aunt as against the claim
of a parent. The factor of which party is the movant in the habeas
48 360 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Colo. 1961).
49 360 P.2d 967, 969 (Colo. 1961). Presumably "stranger" means a non-parent.
50 The leading case in the arigin and history of this use of habeus corpus is New York Foundling
Hospital v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429 (1906).
51 The court relies upon Colo. Rev. Stat.§ 65-1-20 (1953), authorizing the county courts to issue
habeas corpus in certain circumstances.
52 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 65-1-2 (1953).
53 New York Foundling Hospital v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429, 439 (1906); Commonwealth ex rel.
Children's Aid Soc'y v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 66 A.2d 300 (1949); Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo. 369, 212
P.2d 78 (1949). A small minority of jurisdictions limits the inquiry in habeas corpus to the "legal
right" of the parties, but the overwhelming weight of authority is the other way, as are common
sense and ordinary humanity. Ohio, for example, seems to follow the minority view. See May v.
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). Kentucky may also, though 'its cases are in conflict. Compare
Chamblee v. Chamblee, 248 S.W.2d 422 (Ky. 1952) with Shippen v. Bailey, 303 Ky. 10, 196 S.W.2d
425 (1946). Colorado has formerly adopted the majority view. Devlin v. Huffman, 139 Colo. 417,
339 P.2d 1008 (1959) awarded custody to a stranger who had had the child a shorter time than
Lopez, as against the claim of a parent.
54 The leading case of Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W.Va. 765, 42 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1947) grants habeas
corpus to a grandmother as against the child's mother, saying among other things: " . . . the
procedure is different where the custody of an infant is concerned. Habeas corpus then becomes
like unto a chancery proceeding in rem, with the child as the res .... The welfare of the child is
the outstandingly paramount question and the proceeding is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court . . . . The court is not bound by any particular rule to deliver to any particular claimant
the custody involved, the law recognizing no absolute right to a child's custody .... "
55 26 Kan. 650, 40 Am. Rep. 321 (1881) (per Brewer, J.). See also Morris v. Jackson, 66 Wyo.
369, 212 P.2d 78 (1949).
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corpus petition is entirely unimportant. The result in the Chapsky
case would have been no different if the aunt had sought habeas
corpus, since there also the court would have looked at the child's
welfare in deciding who should have custody. If strangers may be
given custody as against a parent when the parent seeks habeas
corpus, the result should be the same where the strangers seek
habeas corpus. Any other result rewards the parent who seizes the
child by force.56
Finally, a notable feature of the Lopez opinion is its complete
omission of any regard for the child's welfare. In a dictum toward
the close, 57 it suggests that the child's presence before the county
court in the adoption proceeding could be obtained by a writ of
habeas corpus ad testificandum. This exhibits a misunderstanding
of this case and of the remedy of habeas corpus, since much more
was at stake than the child's testimony in the adoption proceeding.
In this case the petition for habeas corpus alleged that the child was
being mistreated and abused. Whether that allegation could be
proved or not is the crucial issue. The petitioner should have been
allowed to prove it if she could, since if proved, the state should
56 This is the effect achieved by the Lopez case. Johnson v. Black, 137 Colo. 119, 322 P.2d 99
(1958) held that where the child remains in the custody of the foster parent, who has filed an
adoption petition, custody may be adjudicated on habeas corpus. Presumably this means that the
court in habeas corpus may determine what the child's welfare requires, weighing among other
factors the claim of the parent qua parent. But now under the Lopez case the parent may avoid
any judicial inquiry into custody whatever by seizing the child.
57 360 P.2d 967, 970 (Colo. 1961),
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have intervened for the child's welfare. This is the purpose and
function of habeas corpus. But a reading of the Lopez case gives
the impression that the matter is of no more importance than a
dispute over the ownership of a chattel, and that habeas corpus
involves no more poignant human relationships than a writ of
replevin.
The other cases 58 involving custody during 1961 adhered to the
settled rule that custody matters are peculiarly within the trial
court's discretion, one of these 59 relying upon this rule to affirm
the trial court's grant of permission to the child's mother to remove
the child from Colorado upon the condition that the child be re-
turned to Jefferson County for three weeks each spring. The reason
for the removal was the remarriage of the child's mother to a resi-
dent of Missouri.
VI. ADOPTION
The supreme court held, in Mason v. Benson,60 that appeal from
a decree of adoption could not be taken more than fourteen months
from the date of the decree. In the same case it also held that un-
successful petitioners for adoption of the same child in another case
could not appeal, since they were not parties in the case appealed
from.
Another case, Pool v. Harold,6' reiterated the rule that an
adopted child cannot be disinherited by his adoptive father where
the adoption decree recited that the adoptive parents had promised
not to disinherit the child, and where the adoption decree was en-
tered before the enactment in 1941 of the statute62 voiding contracts
not to disinherit adopted children. This rule applies, according to
this case, even though there was no separate contract not to dis-
inherit.
VII. DEPENDENCY
Two dependency cases were decided during the year. In one63
it was held that the married mother of an alleged illegitimate child
had the burden of proving non-access by her husband during the
period when the child was conceived. The case was remanded for
the taking of additional evidence as to the whereabouts of the
husband at the time of conception, evidence which might overcome
the presumption of legitimacy.
The other case, Dalton v. People in Interest of Moors,64 was a
criminal prosecution for non-support of a child. The defendant had
been adjudged the child's father in a prior dependency proceeding
in the juvenile court. The dependency decree was held void in that
defendant's counsel was allowed, to withdraw and the case was then
heard on the very same day. The court said that this violated the
due process clause since it deprived the defendant of notice and an
opportunity to be heard. The decree so given was therefore open
to collateral attack in the criminal prosecution. The result seems
correct on the facts stated.
58 Flor v. For, 366 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1961); Wiederspohn v. Wiederspohn, 361 P.2d 125 (Colo. 1961).
59 Wiederspohn v. Wiederspohn, supra note 58.
60 361 P.2d 349 (Colo. 1961).
61 367 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1961).
62 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 152-2-4 (1953).
63 Schierenbeck v. Minor. 367 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1961).
64360 P2d 113 (Colo. 1961).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.*
While the Supreme Court of Colorado decided the usual number
of cases in 1961 involving the rules of Evidence, only five cases
appear to be sufficiently significant to warrant comment as affect-
ing the admissibility of evidence in this state.
The case of Ruth v. Department of Highways1 adds one further
principle to the existing law relating to the determination of the
value of realty affected in condemnation proceedings. Ruth owned
about 200 acres of mountain land and the condemnation action was
brought to acquire a right of way 190 feet wide for the construction
of a highway. This would take a total of about 2 acres of Ruth's
land, located on flat ground at the bottom of a canyon. The re-
mainder of his land, not taken, was a steep slope above the land
taken, on which was an old mine tunnel, not presently being oper-
ated. Ruth contended that taking of the right of way would destroy
the value of the remainder of his 200 acres by taking the only land
on which waste could be dumped if mining operations should be re-
sumed, using the tunnel to remove the debris from a mining loca-
tion not owned by Ruth but situated about 1000 feet from the breast
of the tunnel.
The sole question determined by the court was whether or not
the trial court had properly excluded evidence relating to the value
of the property not taken. This evidence, as shown by an offer of
proof, would have shown that negotiations had been under way
with a group of persons to finance the extension of the tunnel to
the mining claim, but that when the condemnation action was
started the negotiations were discontinued because the other parties
felt that after the condemnation the property would be worthless.
Ruth also offered to prove that the operation of the claim would
be profitable and that the opening and use of the tunnel would be
feasible.
The supreme court approved the action of the trial court in
excluding this evidence. As to the negotiations to finance the ex-
tension, which apparently included a possible purchase of the en-
tire property, the court pointed out that these negotiations never
progressed to the point of sale or even to a firm offer to purchase.
For that reason such evidence was not relevant to establish the
value of the property. As to the evidence designed to establish the
basis for a profitable operation of the mining claim, the court held
that this was too remote and too speculative and that settlement
sheets relating to the operation of the mine more than 20 years
before to show the value of the ore removed from the mine in its
earlier operations was properly excluded.
This decision is not inconsistent with the well established rule
that the owner is entitled to have the jury consider the most ad-
vantageous use to which the land may be applied in the future, be-
cause that rule also excludes the allowance of speculative damages.
* Professor of Low, University of Denver Low, Center.
1 359 P.2d 1033 (Colo. 1961).
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The case of Jones v. People2 raises an interesting question rela-
tive to the admissibility of a statement made by the defendant fol-
lowing his arrest. Jones was arrested and signed a written state-
ment detailing the circumstances of a vicious assault which he had
made upon one Powell with a hammer and a large pipe wrench,
followed by the robbery of the hotel in which the assault occurred
and where Powell worked. At the time Jones made this statement
he was unaware of the fact that Powell had died as a result of the
beating. Jones was charged with murder, tried and convicted, the
jury fixing the penalty at death. At the trial the statement made by
Jones was admitted into evidence, presumably over his objection.
Counsel for Jones argued that the admission of this statement was
error, because it was a confession of robbery (with which Jones
was not charged), but that it was not a confession of murder, since
Jones did not then know that Powell had died. He also argued that
it could not even be an admission that Jones had killed Powell, but
only that he had hit him-not that the blow had caused his death.
From this it followed, argued defendant's counsel, that the state's
case was wholly circumstantial-lacking a confession-and that the
trial court erred in not giving a tendered instruction on circum-
stantial evidence.
The supreme court held that if the natural consequences of
Jones' unlawful act would likely cause death, a statement that he
did such act (beat Powell) from which the victim later died "would
be a damning confession." Since the natural and probable conse-
quences of Jones' assault on Powell were death and since Jones
acknowledged doing these acts, his statement amounted to an in-
gredient of a felony-murder. The court then reaffirmed a rule an-
nounced in an earlier case that "A confession is an acknowledg-
ment in express words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the
truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it .... -
and went on to hold that Jones' signed statement was a confession,
and, being supported by corroborating evidence relating to its con-
tents, it was not merely circumstantial evidence.
The case also involved another important point of evidence
having to do with the admission of some items of demonstrative
evidence. Of particular interest was the use of Powell's blood-
stained shirt. The court pointed out that the admission of such evi-
dence without a showing of some use beyond merely displaying it
to the jury might have been prejudicial, but that the shirt having
been introduced because the blood on it indicated that the stains
came from a person having the same type of blood as Powell's its
admission was not improper and that Jones could not assign the
ruling as error.
Hammil v. People4 deals with the scope of allowable cross ex-
amination of an expert witness. A psychiatrist testified, as a witness
for the state, concerning the mental conditiofi of the defendant. His
testimony was based entirely on his own observations of the de-
fendant and his opinion was formed and stated with reference to
his own observations alone. The trial court refused to permit the
2 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961).
3 Id. ot 690.
4 361 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1961).
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defendant's counsel to cross examine the psychiatrist regarding his
use of the report of a psychologist, who had conducted certain
psychological tests on the defendant, since the trial court found
that the psychiatrist had not used this report in forming his opinion.
The cross examination was designed to bring out the contents of
the psychologist's report to show that defendant had such a low
grade mentality as to preclude his responsibility for his conduct.
The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the trial court and pointed
out that the psychologist's report had no tendency whatever to dis-
credit either the psychiatrist's statement that he had -relied solely
on his own observations or to discredit his own opinion. On the
contrary, to permit this cross examination would have served only
to place its hearsay contents before the jury in such a way as to
give them testimonial status. The court distinguishes this case from
that of Archina v. People5 in which the expert's opinion was based
partly on hearsay, and cross examination in the matter was allowed.
A question of first impression in Colorado was presented in the
case of De Gesualdo v. People.6 The defendant was convicted of
burglary and conspiracy to commit burglary. At the trial the de-
fendant's co-conspirator was called as a witness by the prosecution.
The co-conspirator's name had been endorsed as a witness in the
case, but there were circumstances present which indicated that
the district attorney could not have possibly entertained a good
faith belief that the witness would testify if called. He either had
a groundless hope that the witness would have a change of heart
and would testify or he hoped to get before the jury the fact that
the witness believed that his testimony would be incriminating. The
witness refused to testify, claiming his privilege against self in-
crimination. In reversing the conviction the supreme court pointed
out that the effect of such a device is clear and that the conduct
of the district attorney constituted a studied attempt to bring to
the attention of the jury the fact that the defendant's co-conspirator
did not intend to testify for fear of the consequences to himself.
The court held that this staged incident, absent the showing of good
faith on the part of the district attorney in calling him and absent
any instruction by the court to the jury to disregard this by-play,
had a prejudicial effect on the rights of the defendant. The problem
was not one of competency of an accomplice to testify (his com-
petency was conceded), but, rather, whether he could be called for
the purpose of extracting from him a claim of privilege against
incrimination. Faced with a paucity of authority, the supreme court
relied upon a number of Texas cases which had held that the sort
of conduct practiced in this case was prejudicial and grounds for
reversal, at least where no cautionary instruction was given. The
court made the following interesting comment: "In holding that
the conduct in question was reversible error, we take notice that
in the public mind an odium surrounds the claim of constitutional
privilege by a witness in refusing to testify on the ground that his
testimony would tend to incriminate him. This is an aggravating
factor."
5 135 Colo. 8, 307 P.2d 1083 (1957).
6 364 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1961).
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Once again the supreme court has been called upon to consider
the effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof and it seems
to have indicated that it continues to approve its now well estab-
lished rule that the existence of a presumption in favor of the
plaintiff shifts the burden of proof to the defendant on the parti-
cular issue as to which the presumption arose.7 In Bankers Ware-
house Company v. Bennett8 the plaintiff, having stored some nut
meats with the defendant, was entitled to rely upon the presump-
tion of negligence on the part of the bailee (the defendant) which
arises, as here, when the goods are damaged while in storage. After
recognizing the existence of this presumption in favor of the plain-
tiff, bailor, the court then said: ". . . the burden of going forward
with evidence to overcome this presumption rested on the defend-
ant."9 This expresses the rule which is well established in most
jurisdictions and which recognizes that the burden of proof never
shifts from the plaintiff, but that the presumption temporarily
satisfies this burden, and thus places on the defendant the burden
of producing evidence. It does not shift the burden of proof, often
referred to as the risk of non-persuasion. If the court had stopped
there it would have aligned itself with the general conception of
the effect of presumptions. But the court did not stop there. It went
on to say:
Here it was incumbent upon the defendant to show that
the nut meats were not contaminated by reason of its negli-
gence. This it failed to do.
The effect of the rule requiring the bailee to meet the pre-
sumption of negligence arising under such circumstances,
is to place the burdenupon the one best able to discharge
it .... 10
This rule clearly shifts the burden of proof (as distinguished
from the burden of producing evidence) to the defendant. Had the
court simply said that the presumption in favor of the plaintiff
satisfied his burden of proof at that point, and thus placed upon
the defendant the burden of producing evidence to overcome the
presumption in favor of the plaintiff, there would have been no
confusion, and if the defendant had failed to meet his burden of
7 E.g., McGee v. Helm, 362 P.2d 193 (Colo. 1961).
8 365 P.2d 889 (Colo. 1961).
9 Id. at 891.
10 Ibid. (Emphasis supplied).
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going forward the plaintiff would have been entitled to a favorable
verdict. As it is now, the defendant, having the burden of proof,
must satisfy the jury, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that
he was not negligent." This relieves the plaintiff of his initial bur-
den of proof to show that the defendant was negligent and works
greatly to his advantage. The statute referred to in the case imposes
upon the bailee no more than the duty to use reasonable care, and
frees him from liability which could not have been avoided by the
exercise of such care. Under the statute the plaintiff bailor must
prove that the bailee did not use reasonable care; under the doctrine
that the presumption shifts the burden of proof, the bailee must
show that he used due care. This makes a substantial change in the
substantive law under the statute.
The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof has been
stated by many well reasoned decisions, and the following quota-
tions from some of the more representative opinions are enlighten-
ing.
In Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp.
12
the United States Supreme Court used this language, in a case in-
volving a bailment:
The burden of proof in a litigation, wherever the law
has placed it, does not shift with the evidence, and in deter-
mining whether petitioner has sustained the burden the
question often is, as in this case, what inferences of fact
he may summon to his aid. In answering it in this, as in
others where breach of duty is the issue, the law takes into
account the relative opportunity of the parties to know the
fact in issue and to account for the loss which it is alleged
is due to the breach. Since the bailee in general is in a
better position than the bailor to know the cause of the loss
and to show that it was one not involving the bailee's lia-
bility, the law lays on him the duty to come forward with
the information available to him. (Citing cases.) If the
bailee fails, it leaves the trier of fact free to draw an infer-
ence unfavorable to him upon the bailor's establishing the
unexplained failure to deliver the goods safely. (Citing
cases.)
Whether we label this permissible inference with the
equivocal term 'presumption' or consider merely that it is
a rational inference from the facts proven, it does no more
than require the bailee, if he would avoid the inference, to
go forward with evidence sufficient to persuade that the
non-existence of the fact, which would otherwise be in-
ferred, is as probable as its existence. It does not cause the
11 See also Schierenbeck v. Minor, 367 P.2d 333 (Colo. 1961) where the court used this language:
"A child born to a woman married at the time of its conception is by law presumed to be legitimate.
[Citing cases.) Mary [the mother] was confronted with this presumption of legitimacy and its effect.
To overcome it she had to prove that Sedillo [her husband] 'had no access to her during the time
when, according to the course of nature, he could be the father of the child ..... '" This, however
does not affect the burden of proof, since the plaintiff had to establish that the defendant was the
father of the child born out of wedlock, and the presumption in favor of legitimacy operates in
favor of the defendant, thus merely increasing the burden already resting on the plaintiff, requiring
her to prove that the defendant is the father and that her husband is not. The defendant never had
an obligation to do more than meet the evidence offered by the plaintiff. He had no burden of
proof on any issue.
12 314 U.S. 104 (1941).
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burden of proof to shift, and if the bailee does go forward
with evidence enough to raise doubts as to the validity of
the inference, which the trier of fact is unable to resolve,
the bailor does not sustain the burden of persuasion which
upon the whole evidence remains upon him, where it rested
at the start.'
3
The New York Court of Appeals has used this language: 14
In the case at bar the plaintiff made out her cause of
action prima facie by the aid of a legal presumption (refer-
ring to res ipsa loquitur), but when the proof was all in
the burden of proof had not shifted, but was still upon the
plaintiff.... If the defendant's proof operated to rebut the
presumption upon which the plaintiff relied, or if it left the
essential fact of negligence in doubt and uncertainty, the
party who made that allegation should suffer, and not her
adversary. The jury were bound to put the facts and cir-
13 Id. at 110-11.
14 Kay v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 163 N.Y. 447, 57 N.E. 751 (1900).
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cumstances proved by the defendant into the scale against
the presumption upon which the plaintiff relied, and in
determining the weight to be given to the former as against
the latter, they were bound to apply the rule that the
burden of proof was upon the plaintiff. If, on the whole,
the scale did not preponderate in favor of the presumption
and against defendant's proof, the plaintiff had not made
out her case, since she had failed to meet and overcome the
burden of proof.
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the rule as to the effect of
a presumption upon the burden of proof to be found in any reported
case is that of Judge Rodney in Delaware Coach Co. v. Savage.15
He said:
The burden of proof rests upon the party asserting the
affirmative of an issue, such as, in this case, the negligence
of the defendants. If an allegation, such as the negligence
of the defendant, be alleged, the party asserting such fact
must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. The
burden of proof of such fact continues throughout the case
and this burden of proof never shifts. The burden of going
forward with the evidence may shift from time to time
during a trial after the establishing of a prima facie case or
due to some other development in the case, but the burden
of proof of the main fact remains with the party who al-
leged such main fact.
Upon the establishment of a prima facie case the bur-
den of evidence or the burden of going forward with the
evidence shifts to the defensive party. It then becomes
incumbent upon such defensive party to meet the prima
facie case which has been established. For this purpose the
defensive party need not produce evidence which prepon-
derates or outweighs or surpasses the evidence of his ad-
versary, but it is sufficient if such evidence is co-equal,
leaving the proof in equilibrium. If the defensive party,
either by a preponderance of evidence or evidence suffi-
cient to establish equilibrium, has met and answered the
prima facie case, then the burden of going forward with
the evidence returns to the original proponent charged
with the burden of proof who must in turn, by a prepon-
derance or greater weight of evidence, overcome the equili-
brium thus established, or otherwise support his burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence. This is true
whether the original prima facie case is founded upon af-
firmative evidence or established by the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur or other presumption or inference of law.1 6
It would be of great benefit to the profession if the rule as to
the effect of presumptions on the burden of proof could be clarified
in Colorado. The rule as illustrated by the above cases seems to
work well and is logical, and it also avoids some of the most puz-
zling aspects of a question which has become more confused than
is warranted.
15 81 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1948).
16 Id. at 296. (Emphasis supplied).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By WILLIAM P. CANTWELL*
Fewer cases involving new and unsettled problems in the pro-
bate and trust field reached the supreme court in 1961 than in the
last several years.
An exceptionally interesting and important case arose in the
inheritance tax area. People v. Bejarano1 involved inheritance taxes
payable in the estate of a deceased employee of the Shell Chemical
Corporation. For a substantial portion of his employment and his
married life decedent had been domiciled in California, and for a
short time he had been domiciled in Texas. He died domiciled in
Colorado. At issue was the taxation of funds in a company-admin-
istered employees' trust. The widow contended that she owned a
vested interest consisting of one-half of the portion of the assets
acquired while she and the decedent had been domiciled in the two
community property jurisdictions of California and Texas. The com-
missioner contended that the full value of the decedent's interest
should be taxed as a transfer on the ground that there had been a
gift or grant intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after the death of the decedent, within the meaning of Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 138-4-7 (1953). The supreme court determined that the
surviving widow had in fact acquired a vested interest unrelated
to decedent's death and that such interest would be recognized in
Colorado, so that only the portion of the assets not so vested in the
widow could be transferred by the decedent. While the case deals
only with the inheritance tax, it establishes an important prece-
dent in an area which will probably grow in importance as the
population continues to move in and out of community property
states.
Two cases dealt again with the problems caused by dispositive
provisions in favor of a beneficiary "and his heirs," and in both
cases the words were held to be those of limitation and not of sub-
stitution. and purchase. In Estate of Newby
2 and Estate of Hubbs3
the court followed its earlier rulings 4 which established that the
words alone will be treated as words of limitation and that there
must be some other form of clearly demonstrated intent in the will
if any substitution is to occur.
Two cases demonstrated some of the pitfalls of managing busi-
nesses found among estate assets. United States v. Smith5 involved
an intricate fact situation concerning a failing roofing business.
Decedent's administratrix early determined that the business
needed more funds. During the creditor period she obtained ex
parte authority to loan her own funds to the estate for continuation
Mr. Cantwell is a member of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations and is a member of
the Denver firm of Holland & Hart.
1 358 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1961).
2 361 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1961).
3 365 P.2d 513 (Colo. 1961).
4 Feeney v. Mahoney, 121 Colo. 599, 221 P.2d 357 (1950); Conn v. Richards, 126 Colo. 54, 246
P.2d 906 (1952).
5 359 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1961).
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of the business. After some three years the business failed, and a
question of priority of claimants arose. The administratrix claimed
the loan from herself to the estate was, in substance, a necessary
expense of administration and that because of this it was a second
class claim. The claim was allowed and the United States appealed
since the classification was prejudicial to payment of its claims for
taxes, for unremitted withholding, and for damages for an allegedly
faulty or incomplete roofing job at a government installation. It
contended that the statute authorizing business continuation re-
quired notice before continuation and borrowing, and that any in-
herent authority in the county court to authorize an ex parte loan
for business continuation could be only for a short period, and not
for an extended administration. The supreme court rejected the
contention, and affirmed the classification of the amount of the
loan as an expense of administration. It pointed out that notice to
creditors who had not filed claims was impossible during the cre-
ditor period and that a hardship would be worked if proper steps
to conserve assets could not be taken during the creditor period. It
also noted that all creditors knew of the loan and that no objection
had been made during the period when the administratrix was mak-
ing every effort to save the business.
Toplitzky v. Schilt6 involved problems faced by a successor
fiduciary in dealing with substantial amounts disbursed by' a pre-
decessor administratrix who had conducted her deceased hfisband's
business. The issue that reached the supreme court was whether
the successor fiduciary had standing to object on the final report
proceeding. The administratrix contended that the successor fidu-
ciary was not an aggrieved person. This issue was not squarely
decided, but the case was remanded after the trial court had ordered
a restoration of funds; the supreme court determining that the trial
court could do nothing more than to require the administratrix to
render a full, complete and correct account and report. It would
appear that a 1961 amendment, (H. B. 373), to Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 152-10-8 (1) (1953), has corrected the problem presented by the
case, but it nevertheless indicates that before this amendment a
real problem existed in situations in which a successor fiduciary
sought judgment against a predecessor by way of objections to a
final report.
Adoption matters also received attention in two cases. Wright
v. Wysowatcky7 might have been a landmark case had it not been
for a statutory amendment8 of 1961 which has codified the result
the court reached on the facts before it. The sole issue was the right
of an adoptive parent to inherit from an intestate adopted child.
The court held that the parent could so inherit. The court referred
to the amendment, even though it did not control the case before it,
and pointed out that the legislature's action confirmed what the
court held to be the effect of the descent and distribution statute
prior to 1961. As a result of the case and the statute, an area of
previous ambiguity now appears to be well settled.
6361 P.2d 970 (Colo. 1961).
7 363 P.2d 1046 (Colo. 1961).
2R Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-2-4 (1953) as amended by Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 275, § 2.
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Pool v. Harold9 was the second adoption case. It involved the
perplexing problem of decretal provisions preventing the disin-
heritance of an adopted child.10 The holding was that the provision
in the adoption decree could be enforced, and that the adoptive
father's violation of this undertaking, on which the decree was
based, could be prevented by impressing a trust on the estate assets.
The decision is consistent with prior holdings and serves again as a
warning to search the facts carefully, particularly if the adoption
antedatedthe passage of the current Colo. Rev. Stat. § 152-2-4 (1953)
in the year 1941, which barred such decretal provisions.
O'Brien v. Wallace"" involved a procedural issue in a will con-
test. The caveat had alleged improper execution as well as mental
incapacity. The proof of execution was regular and uncontested,
but the trial court submitted the issue of execution to the jury along
with the issue of capacity. Judgment entered on the jury's verdict
for the caveators was reversed and the case was remanded; the
supreme court held that a general verdict on distinct issues cannot
be sustained if one of the issues should never have been submitted
to the jury.
While other cases in the field reached the court, they dealt with
matters of narrower interest or matters falling into the pattern of
previous holdings.
9 367 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1961).
10 Cf. Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134 Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (1957), Dillingham v. Schmidt, 85
Colo. 28, 273 Poc. 21 (1928).
11359 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1961).
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The otherwise orthodox opinion in Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v.
Heflin' is marred by an inaccurate statement of the rule against
perpetuities. The court says, "The common law rule against per-
petuities is recognized in Colorado. Barry v. Newton, 130 Colo. 106,
273 P.2d 735. It is a rule which invalidates interests limited to vest
upon events not certain to occur within 21 years of some life in
being at the creation of the interest. '2 It will be observed that the
crucial phrase, "if at all," is omitted. This is a harmless mistake in
this particular case, but such inaccurate wording may be perpetu-
ated until it comes to be mistaken for the rule. This danger is
especially strong because the court cites Barry v. Newton, where
the same mistake was made.3
That the mistake is serious was evidenced a few years ago,
when a committee of the Denver Bar Association considered resort-
ing to the legislature in order to secure an accurate statement of
the rule. Several district courts, overlooking the phrase, "if at all,"
had held void for remoteness, such valid dispositions as "to A and
his heirs, but if B marries, then to B and his heirs." It could not
be said that the marriage of B was an "event certain to occur with-
in 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."
It might never occur, and therefore under the rule applied by those
district courts, and under the rule as stated in Barry and in the
instant case, the interest to B was held to be void for remote-
ness.
An accurate statement of the rule would have led to the con-
clusion that the interest of B was valid. The rule should be stated
as follows: "No interest is good, unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest. ' 4 In the example given, B's marriage if it happens at
all, will happen within his own life, and therefore the interest given
to him must vest, if at all, within the limit set by the rule.
There is nothing in any Col orado opinion to indicate that the
court intends to establish a rule more strict than the common law
rule against perpetuities, but there is danger that such a conse-
quence may result from repeated inadvertence.
Thompson G. Marsh*
1 366 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1961).
2 Id. at 580.
3 Barry v. Newton is criticized for this omission of "if at all" in 32 DICTA 7, 12 (1955).
4 (Emphasis added.) Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities 1 201 (4th ed. 1942); King, Future
Interests in Colorado 90 (1950); American Law of Property 1 24.1 (1952); Simes & Smith, The Low
of Future Interests 1 1222 (2d ed. 1956).
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Low.
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PERPETUITIES- THE RULE APPLIES
TO REMAINDERS OVER TO CHARITIES
Decedent devised the residue of her estate to the Colorado Na-
tional Bank in trust for 25 years for four beneficiaries, each with a
contingent cross remainder in the income of the others. At the end
of this time the principal was to be divided among the beneficiaries,
their survivors or their issue; if no beneficiaries or issue, then to
certain charitable institutions. The court held the bequest to the
beneficiaries valid. However, they declared the interests of the
beneficiaries' issue and of the charities void for violation of the rule
against perpetuities. Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21,
353 P.2d 385 (1960).
McCabe restates an orthodox rule-that no interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life
in being at the creation of the interest.1 Prior to the instant case
the court apparently had adopted a rule codtrary to other jurisdic-
tions.2 It had implied that public charities were absolutely exempt
from the rule. This comment will trace a brief history of the rule
as applied to charities.
The leading case on gifts over from an individual to a charity
was decided in 1923 in Massachusetts. 3 It involved a gift of a deed
of trust, for certain property, to a bank for its use as long as it con-
tinued in existence. It was then to go to a named charity. The court
held that a gift over to a charity on a remote contingency is void
unless the gift in the first instance is also to a charity.4 The court
indicated that charities can form an exception to the rule, but only
in one instance-when the interest is a gift over from another
charity. As was stated in McCabe, this is the only exception. 5
The facts in Ledwith v. Hurst6 were very similar to those in
the instant case. There the decedent's will provided that certain
property was to go to his wife and daughter for life. At the death
of the survivor it was to pass to the daughter's issue and descend-
ants, and if no issue or descendants to a charity. There was no ex-
press provigion that the issue be alive at the time of the testator's
death. As there were no living issue at testator's death, the court
held the bequest void, stating that although an interest may be
created for a charity in perpetuity, the charitable interest cannot
follow a disposition of the property which is invalid for remoteness. 7
In a later Pennsylvania case," the court reiterated this proposi-
tion concluding, "It follows as a matter of course that if the trunk
of the tree falls, the branches fall with it."9
Several courts have been concerned with the problem of post-
ponement of enjoyment, stating that if the interest is vested it is
not subject to the rule, however remote the time when it may come
1 Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities 191 (4th ed. 1942).
2 King, Future Interests in Colorado, 21 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 123 (1949).
3 Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women, 244 Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923).
4 Ibid.
5 143 Colo. 21, 33, 353 P.2d 385, 391 (1960).
6284 Pa. 94, 133 Atl. 315 (1925); see Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. (1186).
7 Id. at 97, 130 Atl. 317.
8 In re Stephan's Estate, 129 Pa. Super. 396, 195 Atl. 653 (1937).
9 Id. at 408, 195 At!. 659.
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into possession.10 This postponement of enjoyment withdraws any
interest from the rule's operation. The rule against perpetuities
applies only to interests which vest too remotely.'
The Colorado Supreme Court in the instant case has stated
the rule correctly: "It is true that the court has said on a number
of occasions that the rule against perpetuities does not apply to
charities, but never in a case where the interest of individuals or
non-charitable corporations have intervened.'
2
Previous statements of the rule were misleading because in all
Colorado cases dealing with charities the interests would have been
valid, even if given over to non-charitable organizations or individ-
uals. Clayton v. Hallett,"3 the first Colorado case to mention this
exception, involved a trust in perpetuity for the maintenance of a
college for the education of orphan boys. The reference to the rule
was dictum because it would not have applied even if the interest
had not been given to a charity.1 4 The trust might have violated
other rules15 but not the rule against remote vesting, for the inter-
est was vested.
Haggin v. International Trust Co.' 6 involved an estate which
was to be converted into cash, and then used to erect an ornamental
arch in Denver's Civic Center. All the money was to be paid out
by the executor subject to the approval of certain persons. The
court held that a bequest to a charity was to be given the most lib-
eral construction so that the intent of the donor would be enforced.
It was regarded as the "settled law" in Colorado that the rule
against perpetuities does not include charities.' 7 Again, the court
need not have considered the rule because the case dealt with a
vested gift subject to divestment. It is the "settled law" in every
jurisdiction that a bequest such as this one is out of the scope of
the rule, not because the gift was to a charity but because the gift
was vested.
In Town of Clarion v. Central Savings Bank & Trust Co.,'8 a
provision that the city agree to perpetually maintain a gift of a
memorial library was held to be a condition subsequent. The opin-
ion implied, however, that even without an immediate vesting the
gift would be valid because charitable bequests are not subject to
the rule' 9-again, an inaccurate statement.
A gift of the residue of testator's estate to the Colorado State
Bureau of Child and Animal Protection for its use in perpetuity
was declared valid on the assumption that the court has "many
times held" that the rule does not apply to charities.20 This gift
10 Harrison v. Kamp, 395 Ill. 11, 69 N.E.2d 261 (1946); In re Swingle's Estate, 178 Ken. 529, 289
P.2d 778 (1955); Appeal of Appleton, 136 Pa. 354, 20 Ati. 521 (1890); First Huntington Nat'l Bank
v. G.cdeon-Broh Realty Co., 139 W.V. 130, 79 S.E.2d 675 (1953).
11 In re Gageby's Estate, 293 Pa. 109, 141 Ati. 842 (1928). See also Gray, op. cit. supra note 2
at 191.
12 Colorado Nat'l Bank v. McCabe, 143 Colo. 21, 33, 353 P.2d 385, 391 (1960).
1:30 Colo. 231, 70 Pac. 429 (1902).
14 Grant, Powers and Perpetuities in Colorado, 10 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 249, 252 (1938).
15 Simes & Smith, Low of Future Interests, § 1281 (2d ed. 1956) states: "it may be said that this
[rule against indestructibility of trusts] is but a branch of the rule against perpetuities. But the
present tendency is to treut it as a separate, but closely related doctrine."
t669 Colo. 135, 169 Pac. 138 (1917).
17 Id. at 141, 169 Pac. 138, 141 (1917).
IS 71 Colo. 482, 208 Pac. 251 (1922).
It) Ibid.
20 Johnson v. Colorado State Bureau, 86 Colo. 221, 279 Pac. 721 (1929).
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was already vested; the only problem involved the duration of the
interest, consideration of the rule by the court was unnecessary.
The first Colorado case to restrict this alleged exception was
Gregory v. Colorado Nat'l Bank.21 There a will directed the trustees,
after making certain investments which could possibly last longer
than 21 years, to pay one-half of the residue to charities and one-
half for the benefit of the city. The problem was resolved on the
theory that although the enjoyment was postponed, the interest
itself was vested.22 The court cited the Clayton case,23 Haggin v.
International Trust Co. 24 and Johnson v. Colorado State Bureau of
Child & Animal Protection25 in support of it declaration that the
rule has no application to public charities. As pointed out above,
all of these cases were decided on specific issues not actually in-
volving the rule against perpetuities. However, the court did cite
Gray 26 to the effect that the rule may apply, even to charities, if
the interest is based on a condition precedent.
In Smith v. United States Nat'l Bank,27 the court was again
thrown into a trap by an advocate postulating the theory that chari-
ties are not within the scope of the rule against perpetuities. There
the problem was merely one of a vested interest with enjoyment
postponed. The rule should have been discussed only to clarify its
correct application.
Since the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the rule
in these cases is not clear, some confusion has existed concerning
the exact effect of the rule upon charities. As pointed out, the pur-
pose of the rule is not to invalidate present interests, but to prevent
the remote vesting of future interests.28 The fact that the future
interest is in favor of a charity in no way eliminates the social in-
convenience. 29 The only exception is in the instance of a gift over
from one charity to another.
The rule against perpetuities has been a source of legal con-
foundment since its inception. As in all rules, we must have excep-
tions to add to the perplexity of the law. Before the decision in the
instant case, few have realized how very narrow the exception is.
Gwen Gregory
21 91 Colo. 172, 13 P.2d 273 (1932).
22 Ibid.
23 Supra note 16.
24 Supra note 18.
25 Supra note 16.
26 Supra note 18 at 177-78, 13 P.2d at 275.
27 120 Colo. 167, 207 P.2d 1194 (1949).
28 Gray, op. cit. supra note 2 at 428.
29 4 Restatement, Property § 396 (1944).
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COURTS- INTERNAL REVENUE -
EXECUTION OF MORTGAGES
The Bank of America was the holder of a deed of trust covering
property upon which there was a junior United States tax lien.
The Bank foreclosed pursuant to a power of sale contained in the
trust deed without giving notice to the United States, and later
brought an action1 to quiet title. The district court held that the
United States' lien had been extinguished by the exercise of the
power of sale. This decision was reversed by the court of appeals
of the 9th circuit. The United States Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that the statute2 was not exclusive as to other state procedures
and that such a sale effectively extinguished the United States' lien.
Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Assoc. v. United States,
363 U.S. 237 (1960).
Mortgagees who found (when it became necessary to foreclose
their mortgages) that a junior United States' lien had been filed
against the property were, for years, confronted with a problem in
obtaining clear title.3 As far back as 1868 the United States was
held to be an indispensable party to any action involving property
in which it had an interest. 4 Such a suit was therefore against the
United States and could not be maintained without its consent. 5
Only if the United States brought suit to enforce its own tax lien
pursuant to a statute6 passed that same year was the mortgagee
able to obtain clear title. Again attempting to remedy the situation,
Congress later passed a statute authorizing the mortgagee to start
proceedings if the government failed to do so. 7 In 1931, Congress
further permitted a private mortgagor to make the United States a
party to an action in either a federal district court or in a state
court.8
Meanwhile a substantial amount of litigation, involving the
above legislation and the effect of state procedures on federal liens,
had created considerable conflict in the federal courts. 9 The prin-
cipal case, along with United States v. Brosnan,10 finally, questioned
whether the statute authorizing state action" was exclusive of
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1948), as amended ch. 139, 63 Stat. 105 (1949). The pertinent
part of the statute for this comment is included in I (a) as follows: "(a) Under the conditions
prescribed in this section and I 1444 of Title 28 for the protection of the United States, the United
States may be named a party in any civil action or suit in any district court, * * or in any State
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter, to quiet title to or for the foreclosure of a mortgage
or other lien upon real or personal property on which the United States has or claims a mortgage
or other lien."
2 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1948), as amended, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 105 (1949).
3 H.R. Rep. No. 95, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1931).
4 Siren v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152 (1868); accord, Minnesota v. U.S., 305 U.S. 382
(1939).
5 Siren v. United States, supra note 4.
U Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 106, 15 Stat. 167. A similar provision now appears in Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, 7403.
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, I 7424. This action was to be brought in a district court of the United
States.
8 28 U.S.C. I 2410 (1948), as amended, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 105 (1949).
9See 49 Yale L.J. 1106 (1940).
10 363 U.S. 237 (1960). This case came up to the Supreme Court at the same time as the principal
case and will be mentioned briefly later in the comment.
11 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (1948), as amended, ch. 139, 63 Stat. 105 (1949).
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other state procedures and, if not, then what was the effect of those
procedures.
The type of procedure which was tested in the principal case
was a non-judicial power of sale with no requirement for notice
to the junior lienors. Cases involving this question usually arose
when there had been a private sale pursuant to a power of sale
contained in a trust deed and either the new owner brought an
action to quiet title 12 or the United States brought an action to
enforce its lien against the property which had been sold.13
In Oden v. United States, 4 the court, after declaring that the
junior United States' lien on the property constituted an apparent
cloud on the title so long as the lien remained of record, held the
United States' lien had been extinguished by the exercise of a
private power of sale.15 However, the decision was somewhat limited
by the court's holding that the lien was extinguished only in so far
as it affected the title to that particular property. 6 A few years
later two district courts in Texas also held that the private power
of sale was a valid extinguishment of junior federal liens.17 The
court in Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 8 based
its decision primarily on the theory that the right of sale and con-
tract was a valuable right which could not be impaired by any
subsequent act of the debtor. 19 Since the United States derived its
interest in the property from the debtor, it could not have a better
right than the debtor.'0 Therefore, since the private sale (not
adequate to cover the prior lien) extinguished any equity the
debtor had, it likewise extinguished the United States' lien on
that property.
21
This reasoning was rejected by the court of appeals of the 6th
circuit in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States.22 In that case
the action was brought after a private sale had been held by the
prior lien holder, in which the court was asked to declare the junior
United States' lien extinguished by the private power of sale. It
was held that the foreclosure under the power of sale had no effect
on the United States' lien and that no suit could be maintained
against the United States unless it strictly complied with the terms
of the statute under which consent is given." The Metropolitan
case was criticized because the court did not distinguish between
an action asking for a decree that the federal lien had been extin-
guished and an action asking for a decree of extinguishment.' 4 This
12 Trust Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 683 (S.D. Tex. 1933); Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 47 F.2d 942 (N.D. Tex. 1931); Oden v. United States, 33 F.2d 553 (W.D. La. 1929).
13 United States v. Cless, 150 F. Supp. 687 (M.D. Penn. 1957); United States v. Ryan, 124 F.
Supp I (D. Minn. 1954); United States v. Cox, 119 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ga. 1953); United States v.
Taft, 44 F. Supp. 564 (S.D. Calif. 1942).
14 33 F.2d 553 (W.D. La. 1929).
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 13; Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, supra
note 13.
18 47 F.2d 942 (N.D. Tex. 1931).
19 Id. at 943.
20 Id. at 944.
21 Supra note 18.
22 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 630 (1940).
23 Id. at 312.
24 See 49 Yale L.J. 1106 (1940).
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distinction was drawn by the court in United States v. Boyd,25 which
refused to follow the Metropolitan case. 26 The Boyd case was an
action brought by the United States to foreclose its tax lien. The
court held that a junior federal lien was effectively extinguished
by a valid foreclosure in a non-judicial power of sale.
2 7
A state judicial sale which did not comply with the statute
28
was sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court.29 In that case,
a sale of mortgaged land arose under a writ of fieri facias. Under
Pennsylvania law this constituted a judicial sale which had the
effect of extinguishing junior liens, even when their holders were
not required to be parties to the proceedings. The Court held that
such procedure did effectively extinguish the federal lien.30
The decisions in the principal case and in the Brosnan case
appear to be based upon three major factors:
(1) A need for uniformity in tax law is outweighed by the
severe dislocation to local property relationships which
would result from disregarding state procedures. 31
(2) The use of the word "may" in the statute3 2 indicates a
permissive tenor implying that other procedures are per-
missible.
33
(3) The granting of a right to bring an action to quiet title
indicates that Congress must have recognized the possi-
bility that state procedures might affect federal liens.34
Although these decisions appear to be sound, four justices dissented.
Consequently, state procedures to foreclose when junior federal
liens exist should be used with caution.35
David Knapp
25 246 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957).
26 Id. at 482. The court held that the Metropolitan case arose upon the unsound premise that
the action was one to extinguish the United States' lien rather than to determine that the tax lien did
not exist. It was pointed out that when the Metropolitan case was decided, J 2410 of Title 28 did
not include actions to clear title. However, other cases such as Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, cited at note 18 supro, declared that the court being a court of equity could decree
what was just, and was not required to decree another sale since it would be a vain and useless
thing.
27 United States v. Boyd, supro note 25, at 483. In spite of this holding, the Boyd case gave
effect to the provisions of I 2410(c) and gave the United States one year to redeem.
28 28 U.S.C. 1 2410 (1948), as amended, ch. 139, 63 Stot. 105 (1949).
29 United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960). This case arose at the same time as the
principal case. It should be noted that the lower federal courts had conflicted on this question.
This conflict is evidenced by United States v. Cless, 254 F.2d 590 (3rd Cir. 1958), and United States
v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1957), both respectively holding such judicial sales valid; Remis
v. United States, 273 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1960), and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107
F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939), both holding that the procedure as set forth in f 2410 must be strictly
complied with.
30 United States v. Brosnan, supro note 29.
31 Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings Assoc. v. United States, 363 U.S. 237, 252 (1960).
32 Subsection (a) states, "Under the condition prescribed in this section a * a the United States
may be named a party in any civil action * * * " (Emphasis added.)
33 Bank of America Nat'i Trust and Savings Assoc. v. United States, supra note 31 at 246.
34 Ibid.
35 The one-year right of redemption in the government must also be considered because in a
later case involving a judicial sale wherein the United States was not a party, the Court held that
state law was applicable only so far as it does not conflict with federal low. United States v.
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 364 U.S. 301 (1960). There the United States was allowed one
year to redeem although state law allowed only six months. Even in cases of private sale, earlier
courts have given the United States one year to redeem.
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BOOK REVIEW
EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES.
By F. Hodge O'Neal and Jordan Derwin, Durham, North Carolina:
Duke University Press. 1961. Pp. 263. $10.
This timely work bears the subtitle, "'Squeeze-Outs' in Small
Enterprises," which describes in colloquial terms the subject of
the volume. This work was prepared by Duke University under
the Small Business Administration Management Research Grant
program with Professor O'Neal acting as project director and his
co-author designated the research associate.
The style of writing is such that it will be equally valuable
for both the lawyer and his businessman client in studying the
problems caused by business conflicts between majority and mi-
nority groups in both corporations and partnerships. Following
the opening chapter devoted to a description of the scope of the
study and the general background of the problems involved, Pro-
fessor O'Neal launches into an interestingly documented discussion
of the underlying causes of squeeze-outs. Some of the chapter sub-
titles indicate a discussion of problems frequently encountered in
Colorado business practice, such as §2.03-"The inactive sharehold-
er," §2.04-"The decease of founder and other key shareholders,"
§2.08--"Disregard of corporate ritual and failure to keep proper
records," §2.10-"Viewing incorporated enterprise as a 'partnership'
or 'family business'," §2.15-"Inability of minority shareholder in
close corporation to dispose of his interest," and §2.16-"Difficulty of
valuing a business interest." The authors needled the legal profes-
sion a bit under §2.19-"Businessmen's failure to obtain preventive
legal services and inability of many lawyers to supply adequate
preventive services."
Three chapters are devoted to a detailed discussion of squeeze-
out techniques, including a discussion of the rather unlikely situa-
tion of a squeeze-out of the majority by a minority group.
Chapter 6 is devoted to squeeze-outs in partnerships and con-
tains an interesting commentary on the relative possibility of a
squeeze-out in a partnership as compared to a corporation. On page
142 it is stated:
The inherent simplicity of the partnership form results
in fewer opportunities (as compared with the corporation)
for subtlety or sophisticated dealings in effecting a squeeze-
play. Consequently, many partnership squeeze cases involve
outright fraud, close approximations to it, or flagrant ap-
propriations of partnership assets or business opportunities.
Because of the more highly developed concept of fiduciary
duty applied to partnership relations and the ease of dissolu-
tion, the partnership is not as amenable as the corporation
to some of the squeeze-out techniques. A wide-awake
partner, with the aid of timely and competent advice, often
can more easily prevent or thwart a squeeze-out than
can a corporate shareholder under similar pressure.
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Thus, in a situation where there is some likelihood of conflict
between the business associates, the attorney may well want to
advise the use of a partnership rather than a corporation.
A chapter is devoted to arrangements which avoid squeeze-
outs. These include buy-out arrangements, the advantages of
arbitration and other arrangements for settling disputes, share-
holder agreements, provisions requiring the declaration of dividends,
employment contracts, use of the provision, new to Colorado cor-
poration law with the 1958 Act, permitting the requirement of
higher than majority votes for corporate action by inclusion of such
requirement in articles of incorporation or by-laws, and other
similarly useful devices.
Finally, Professor O'Neal includes a chapter discussing legisla-
tive measures and other possible changes in the law which might
tend to reduce or alleviate the problems created by business con-
flicts. A comparison of English and Irish laws on this subject is
made and specific statutes throughout the United States are dis-
cussed.
An appendix includes detailed briefs of four typical squeeze-
out cases, a comprehensive table of cases keyed to applicable
portions of the text, and a complete index.
All in all, this is a very useful study, and lawyers representing
businessmen would do well to have this volume on their shelves.
Claude M. Maer, Jr.*
Member of the Denver firm of Holland & Hart.
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